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INTRODUCTION
The outlook for the Philippines for 1997 was quite bullish, and
with good reason. Following a recession towards the late 1990, the
economy began to recover in 1993 and further strengthened in 1994-
96 when it posted real GDP growth rates of 4.4, 4.8, and 5.8 percent,
respectively. More than that, the Philippines was deemed as finally
being on the path towards more stable and sustainable growth, after
decades of lackluster economic performance characterized by boom-
bust cycles and unsustained growth momentum. This was attributed
to prudent macroeconomic management, continued structural
reforms, and political stability, which resulted in a more liberalized
investment setting and a more conducive business environment.
The Philippine economy's strong performance was thus expected
to continue.
In July 1997, the Thai financial crisis broke out; which had strong
contagion effects on the neighboring economies, including the
Philippines. In fact, the Philippine peso was among the initial
currencies subjected to heavy speculative attacks. However, the
country was not as severely affected in that the currency crisis did , ;, ..'
not develop into a full blown financial and economic crisis. This
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was attributed to the structural reforms that had already been
implemented, including financial sector reforms. The consensus was
that the Philippines world be among the first to recover from the
regional crisis.
The Philippines posted a respectable, albeit decelerated real GDP
growth rate of 5.2 percent by the end of 1997. While the domestic
economy slightly contracted in 1998, it fared better relative to the
substantial economic contractions in Indonesia, Thailand, and
Malaysia. The worst of the regional crisis would seem to be over
and the crisis economies are deemed as being on the road to recovery,
although full recovery is not expected any time soon (ADB 1999).
The Philippine economy is thus expected to grow by around 2-3
percent in 1999, on the back of government pump-priming, the
recovery of the agricultural sector from adverse weather effects, and
the overall recovery of the region. Any modest recovery, however,
will be taking place in the context of a significantly weakened
macroeconomy, as the country's fiscal position, investment rate,
inflation rate, unemployment rate, and overall sectoral performance
took a turn for the worse as a result of the regional financial crisis.
The full economic effects of the crisis on the Philippines are still
unraveling. But more serious are the social implications of the crisis,
which could persist even after the crisis and its direct effects have
been resolved.
This paper looks at the contagion effects of the Asian crisis on
the Philippine economy, the policy responses, and their social
implications. In particular, the paper discusses the role of the
financial sector in the evolution of the crisis. In the following section,
the recent performance of the Philippine economy, the financial
sector and the social sector is reviewed in order to better situate the
Asian crisis and its contagion effects on the Philippines. The third
then looks at the economic and social impacts of the Asian crisis on
the Philippines, as well as the government's policy responses. The
government's social safety net programs are then discussed in the
fourth section. Finally, the fifth section presents some conclusions
and the continuing policy issues.MILO"CONTAGION EFFECTS 69
RECENT PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
Macroeconomic developments
The challenge faced by policymakers in the 1990s was to turn
the illusion of the 1980s- the transformation of the Philippines into
an outward-oriented, export-led economy-into a reality. Only by
painful structural adjustment could the Philippine economy hope
to achieve sustained growth. This had to be accomplished while the
macroeconomic environment still needed stabilizing, in order to
break the pattern of growth, overheating, BOP crisis, restrictive
policies and economic slowdown, which had consistently
characterized the post-war Philippine economy (World Bank 1992,
Fabella 1994).
In May 1992, President Ramos was elected into office. His vision
was to transform the Philippines into a newly industrialized
economy (NIE). The tasks involved in this transformation included:
(1) the restoration of political stability; (2) the implementation of
economic reforms to level the playing field and democratize the
economy to make it more competitive; (3) infrastructure and energy
development; (4) environmental protection and preservation; and
(5) bureaucratic reforms (Ramos 1994). In line with the second
objective, the government implemented policy reforms in critical
areas of the economy, which served to reinforce the reforms of the
1980s. In particular, further tariff reforms were implemented to
achieve a more neutral tariff policy. In the fiscal sector, various tax
reforms were initiated, such as the expanded coverage of the value
added tax in 1995. Also, the government's privatization program
was accelerated, and private sector participation wa_ encouraged
especially in various energy and infrastructure projects through the
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme.
The Foreign Investments Act of 1991 expanded the number of
sectors open to full foreign ownership, streamlined approval
procedures, and made the remaining restrictions and prohibitions
more transparent. The government further liberalized foreign
investments in October 1994. Foreign exchange transactions were70 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
also significantly liberalized and upgraded. Beginning in January
1992, there was full deregulation of remaining restrictions on current
account transactions. The full lifting of mandatory surrender
requirements on foreign exchange receipts, foreign exchange
.transactions outside the banking system, deposits in foreign currency
deposit units (FCDUs), and full and immediate remittance.privileges
for investment purposes were some of the measures put in place to
support the policy thrust of open trading and investments. Rules
covering foreign investments in Central Bank-approved securities
were also relaxed. Finally, entry barriers in key industries such as
telecommunications, transport (land, air and sea), banking, and other
key commodities such as cement were dismantled or relaxed.
Following near zero growths in 1991-92, the economy again
began to post modest growth rates in 1993 (Table 1). This was
attributed to improvements in infrastructure, particularly in power
generation which eased supply side constraints; continued
liberalization measures which increased the competitiveness of
several sectors and encouraged the inflow of foreign investment; a
stable macroeconomic and political environment which buoyed
investor confidence; and the economic recovery of the country's
major trading partners. All these helped to create a more conducive
business environment. Furthermore, the Philippines was deemed
as finally being on the path towards more stable and sustainable
growth after decades of boom-bust cycles, and a decade of structural
reforms that considerably reduced macroeconomic distortions and
liberalized a once extremely protected economy.
On the supply side, the industrial sector, which accounted for
around 35 percent of GDP, was a major contributor to the country's
growth performance. Construction, in particular, performed
strongly. Manufacturing, which accounted for around 25 percent of
GDP, also performed fairly well. There was also strong growth in
the services sector, which constituted more than 40 percent of GDP,
particularly transportation and communication, and financial
services. The latter was due to efforts to liberalize these subsectors.MILO:CONTAGION EFFECTS 71
Table 1. Growth of real GDP by industry, 1990-97 (in %)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
GNP 5,0 0,3 1.7 2,1 5,3 5,0 7,2 5.3
GDP 3.2 -0.6 0,4 2.1 4.4 4.8 5.8 5.2
Agriculture 0.5 1.0 0,1 2.0 3,4 0.8 4.3 2.8
Industry 3.0 -2.7 -0.3 1.6 5.8 7.0 6.2 6.2
Manufacturing 2.7 -0.5 -1,7 0,7 5.(3 6,8 5,6 4.2
Construction 12.1 -15,9 6.1 5,7 9.4 6.6 10.9 16.4
Utilities -0.3 4.7 0,7 2.8 13.9 13,0 7.6 4,8
_ervice 4.9 0.2 1.0 2.5 4.3 5.0 6.4 5.5
Transportation, 2,2 0,5 1.4 2.5 4.2 5.8 7.4 8.2
communication
Financial, realestate 10,1 _2.7 0.4 2.4 5,5 7,3 13.7 13.0
Source of basic data: National Statistical Coordination Board,
Philippine economic growth in the 1990s was als0 qualitatively
different in that it was truly propelled by exports and investments.
Manufactured goods constituted the bulk of exports, thus reducing
the country's traditional reliance on volatile commodity earnings.
External debt and debt service payments were also significantly
lower in real terms relative to the late 1980s. As a result of
restructuring and the rapid growth of exports, the country's debt
servicing burden in 1997 was at a more comfortable level of 10.4
percent of exports, compared to around 35 percenti n the mid-1980s.
Moreover, international investors' confidence in the economy was
stronger than ever, as evidenced by the substantial inflow of foreign
investments.
The country's growth performance was also mirrored in the
employment trends, although not as strongly. The October
unemployment rate, which is deemed as least affected by seasonal
factors, fell from 8.6 percent in 1992 to 7.4 percent in 1996. The
underemployment rate, on the other hand, fell from 21.4 percent in72 [ JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
1993to 19.4percent in 1996. In actual numbers, there was a decline
in the number of unemployed persons from 2.267 million in 1992 to
2.195 million in 1996. However, the number of underemployed
.persons rose from 5.077 miUion to 5.326 million over the same time
period. Also, in terms of sectoral growth of employment, most of
the increase was recorded in the services sector and construction,
which saw their percentage shares in total employment increase in
the 1990s (Table 2).In contrast, the share of manufacturing in total
employment fell slightly from 1992 to 1997.
Table 2, Distribution of total employment by major industry group, 1990-97 (in %)
Industry 1990 1991 t992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Total(in thousands) 22,532 22,979 23,917 24,443 25,166 25,696" 27,442 27,888
Agriculture, fishery and 45.2 45.3 45.4 45.8 44.7 44.1 41,7 40.4
forestry
Industry 15.0 16.0 1610 15,5 1518 15.6 16,6 16.7
Mining and quarrying 0.6 0,7 0,6 0.5 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4
Manufacturing 9,7 10.4 10,6 10.0 10.3 10,0 10.0 9.9
Electricity, gas and water 0.4 0.4 0,4 0.4 0.4 0,4 0.4 0.5
Construction 4.3 4,6 4.3 4.5 4,7 4.8 5,7 5.9
Services 39,7 38-.7 38,5 38.6 39.5 40,3 41.6 42.9
Wholesale and Retail 14.0 13.8 13,7 14.0 14.2 14,6 14,8 15.1
Transportation, 5.0 5:0 5.1 5.6 5,6 5.8 6.0 6,3
communication and storage
2.0 2.0 1,9 2,0 2.0 2.1 2,5 2.4 Financial, real estate
and business
Community, social and 18,7 17,9 17,8 17.1 17.8 17.7 18.3 19.0
personal
Source of basic data: October Rounds of the Labor Force Survey, National Statistics Office.
In terms of the productivity of labor, however, the trend was
reversed in the 1990s relative to the previous periods. In particular,
gross value added per worker in all sectors, except mining and
• quarrying, increased between 1991 and 19971 Medalla (1998)•
attributed the seeming inconsistency between improvements in
efficiency measures in the manufacturing sector and continuingMILO :CONTAGION EFFECTS75
structural problems to a period of adjustment to amore open trade
regime, an overvalued currency, and a shift in protection from
manufacturing to agriculture.
Concerns over the sustainability of the country's economic
growth had been expressed. Of particular concern was the widening
gap in the trade balance (Figure 1).Although export growth overtook
import growth in 1995, most Philippine manufactures exports had
very high import Contents so that their growth contributes much
less to foreign exchange earnings than the numbers suggest
(Krugman et al. 1991). In particular, electronics accounted for over
half of total exports in 1997. On the other hand, the increase in
merchandise imports was accounted forby capital formation goods
necessary for production expansion. Also, unlike in the previous
periods, fiscal expansionism was not to blame for the large deficit
and it was mostly financed by nondebt capital inflows. Furthermore,
some improvements in the efficiency and competitiveness of the
manufacturing sector following the various reforms had been
reported (Medalla et al. 1995; Tecson et al. 1996). The country's
merchandise trade deficit was significantly offset by the surplus in
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Figure 1. Trade balance and current account balance, 1990-97 (in % of GDP)74 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
nonmerchandise trade, which was largely due to the remittances of
overseas Filipino workers (OFWs). Thus, the current account deficit
remained fairly stable at around 5 percent of GDP.
On the other hand, the country registered balance of payments
surpluses from 1994 to 1996 as a result of strong foreign investment
inflows. The net inflow of foreign investment to the Philippines from
1970 to 1987 was negligible, averaging just 0.3 percent of GDP. Fairly
significant inflows were recorded beginning only in i988 due to the
government's debt for equity program, and the foreign investment
and foreign:exchange market reforms in the 1990s. Thus, net foreign
investments reached around 4.2 percent of GDP in 1996. In terms of
composition, the surge in portfolio investment inflows began in 1993
and significantly outpaced foreign direct investment inflows. For
instance, in-!996, total inflow of portfolio investments amounted to
almost US$6.9billion, while total foreign direct investment inflows
amounted to around US$1.5 billion. In net terms, however, foreign
direct investments were still dominant because portfolio investment
outflows were also substantial (Figure 2). This indicated the short-
term and speculative nature of foreign portfolio investments. A more
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in the net foreign assets of commercial banks, which rose from
around US$40 million in 1991 to more than US$4.2 billion in 1996,
or around 5 percent of GDP.
Another area of concern was the management of government
finances. For the first time in the postwar period, the National
Government posted a budgetary surplus of less than 1 percent of
GNP from 1994 to 1997 (Figure 3). The consolidated public sector
fiscal position (CPSFP) also improved, falling to a deficit of around
to 0.5 percent of GNP in 1994 and registering a surplus in 1996.1
This was due partly to an extensive restructuring of the tax system
over the past decade, which led to the rise in tax effort from an
average of 11.3 percent in 1975-85 to 16.2 percent in 19967 However,
the improvement in fiscal positions was also highly dependent on
privatization proceeds, which are nonrecurring income. For instance,
privatization proceeds in 1994 and 1995 amounted to more than t234
billion and t2 24.9 billion, respectively, which meant that the
underlying CPSFP still registered deficits of around 2.5 percent and
1.5 percent of GNP, respectively. Also, there was a deterioration in
the buoyancy of the tax system with respect to GNP. The tax
buoyancy coefficient fell from 1.41 in 1987-92, to 1.15 in 1993-97,
which implied a deterioration in tax administration (Manasan 1994,
1998). 3
Thus, while significant gains had been achieved in tax
mobilization especially in the last six years, the fiscal position
remained tenuous and more remained to be done. Efforts to broaden
the tax base and improve collection efficiency had so far been
insufficient to ensure the stability of public sector finances in the
long run (Manasan 1994, 1998). Compared to the fiscal excesses of
the past, however, fiscal policy in the 1990s was considerably more
The consolidated public sector fiscal position (CPSFP) include the combined balance sheets
of the national government, monitored government-owned orcontrolled corporations, local
government units andgovernment financial institutions.
2I.e., theratio oftotal tax revenue toGNP (Manasan1998).
3Thetax buoyancycoefficient measures the percentage change intax yield given ape_entage
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Figure 3. Consolidated Public Sector (CPSFP) and the National Government's
Fiscal Positions, 1985-97 (in% of GNP)
prudent. Furthermore, the CPSFP had been posting surpluses in its
primary balance since 1987,which averaged around 4.5 percent from
1991 to 1996.4Thus, total national government expenditure net of
debt service was fairly stable. However, the rapid growth in debt
service was at the expense of capital outlays and maintenance and
other operating expenditures; which suffered major cutbacks. The
cutbacks were not restored even with the improvement in fiscal
position in the 1990s. Hence, capital expenditures of the national
government consistently fell from 4.6 percent of GNP in 1975-85, to
2.9 percent in 1986-91, and 2.7 percent in 1992-96 (Manasan 1998).
The low level of public investment in infrastructure would
necessarily impair the economy's growth prospects.
Monetary policy in the 1990s was also tighter compared to the
previous periods. Thus, while high inflation in the past was
attributed primarily to the growth of money supply, this was not
the case in the 1990s. Although inflation had been brought under
control from the mid-1980s, it re-emerged as an immediate concern
towards the end of the 1980s and early into the 1990s.This was due
The primary balance is equal to the overall balance less interest payments, and is deemed
to present a more accurate picture of the government's fiscal stance (Manasan 1998).MIL0:CONTAGION EFFECTS [ 77
to the growth of the fiscal deficit and its monetization; cost push
effects from the nominal depreciation of the exchange rate; sharp
oil price increase due to the Gulf war; and supply bottlenecks that
resulted from adverse weather conditions. The monetary authorities'
contractionary stance reduced the growth of money supply from 28
percent in 1989 to just 11 percent in 1992. Inflation consequently
went down to single-digit levels, averaging around 8.5 percent from
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Figure 4. Inflation rate, 91-day Treasury bill rate, and the exchange rate,
1990-96
The conduct of monetary policy was complicated by the
liberalization of the capital account in 1993. The surge in foreign
exchange inflows put strong pressure on the Philippine peso to
appreciate. Because of its potential adverse effect on the export sector,
monetary authorities sought to minimize such appreciation by
intervening in the foreign exchange market, among other measures.
The rapid increase in the Philippine central bank's net foreign assets
accelerated the growth of money supply to an average of 25 percent
from 1993 to 1995. Higher liquidity contributed to the decline in
interest rates, although it also fueled inflation. To meet monetary
and inflation targets set under the country's IMF stabilization78 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
program, the BSP sterilized the monetary effects of its foreign
exchange purchases. However, the appreciation of the peso was not
arrested as the substantial differential between domestic and foreign
interest rates induced further capital inflows. The fiscal surplus eased
the pressure on domestic interest rates, but tight monetary policy
prevented domestic interest rates from going down further to reduce
the differential (Lamberte 1994). Although sterilized intervention
enabled the BSP to build up its gross international reserves, it also
proved to be very cosilybecause the BSP incurred huge quasi-fiscal
losses on the interest-bearing securities it issued to sterilize excess
monetary growth (Cororaton 1995). Thus, the combination of still
relatively high inflation rates, stable interest rates, and a strong peso
prevailed in 1993-96. The appreciation of the peso, which
experienced the largest real currency appreciation during the 1990s
relative to the other Southeast Asian currencies, exacerbated the
country's trade deficit. Also, the peso appreciation coupled with
high interest rates led to the growth of the nontradeable sector, with
investments going into real estate and the stock market, as well as
encouraged foreign borrowing.
Overall, the Philippines' macroeconomy was marked by
significant improvements in the 1990s. There were some cause for
concern, particularly with respect to the widening trade deficit and
the fiscal position. However, these were not deemed as "critical",
and were expected to improve as the economy continued to grow
and restructure. More importantly, with the exchange rate becoming
more responsive to financial flows relative to real flows, and the
dominance of short-term capital flows, the economy was becoming
more vulnerable to shocks in the international capital markets.
Hence, the importance of fine-tuning monetary, fiscal and exchange
rate policies in order to maintain a stable macroeconomy was
emphasized (Yap and Reyes 1994).
Financial sector developments
The period from 1980 to 1997 was marked by substantial financial
reforms. There was a snowballing effect, in that the reform processMILO' CONTAGION EFFECTS 79
set in place the motion for further reforms. The Philippines formally
embarked on a financial liberalization program in 1980 as part of an
overall structural adjustment program. It included the gradual
liberalization of interest rates from 1981 to 1983; the easing of
restrictions on the range of operations financial institutions were
allowed to conduct in the domestic markets, such as the introduction
of universal banking in 1980; and rationalization of financial market
regulations, including higher capital requirements for banks and
nonbank quasi-banks (NBQBs) (Remolona and Lamberte 1986).
However, soon after the start of financial liberalization, the financial
system underwent a crisis of confidence. This was triggered by the
defaults of a prominent businessman who fled the country in 1981
and compounded by a series of investment frauds and stockbroker
failures (Laya 1982). The financial crisis deepened as a result of the
political and economic crises in 1983-85, which led to significant
financial shallowing (World Bank 1986).
Financial reforms were resumed in 1986, which specifically
addressed problems endemic to the system since the 1960s, and
further highlighted by the reform effort and financial crisis during
the early 1980s. These included the inter-linked problems of fraud
or insider abuse by bank owners or officers and inadequate/
ineffective prudential supervision and regulation of banks. Policies
effecting prudential bank management were instituted. These
included increased minimum capitalization requirements;
compliance with the minimum risk asset ratio; the single borrower's
limit; limit on loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related
interests (DOSRI); allowable interlocking directorships and
officerships; provisions for loan loss or doubtful accounts; audit and
reporting requirements; and stricter bailout policy of problematic
banks (Bautista 1992).
The government also rehabilitated ailing financial institutions,
notably the government-owned banks and the rural banks.
However, the problem was not just the lack of prudential rules, but
a weakened Central Bank of the Philippines (CBP) - both financially
and politically. A strong central bank, which effectively carries out80 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
its role of supervising financial institutions, is a prerequisite for a
stable financial system (World Bank 1988). Thus, the CBP was
likewise rehabilitated in 1993, with the creation of a new,
independent Central Monetary Authority called the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas (BSP).
Other reforms implemented in the 1990s included the
deregulation of the entry of new domestic banks and bank branching
in 1993 and further rationalized in 1995, and the easing of restrictions
O n the entry of foreign banks in 1994. Ten foreign banks were initially
allowed to open up to six branches, while others could buy up to 60
percent of an existing local bank or subsidiary. Reforms in the other
sectors of the financial system included the liberalization of the
private insurance industry in 1995, and efforts to develop the equity
markets such as the unification of the Manila and Makati Stock
Exchanges to form the Philippine Stock Exchange in 1994. In
particular, the liberalization of foreign investments and foreign
exchange transactions had a significant impact on the growth of the
capital market.
The Philippine financial system consists of banks and nonbank
financial institutions (NBFIs). Banks are classified as commercial
banks (including expanded fcommercial or universal banks), thrift
banks (savings and private development banks, and stock savings
and loan associations), rural banks, and specialized government
banks. The specialized government banks have all been upgraded
to commercial bank status by 1996. NBFIs include insurance
companies, investment houses, financing companies, securities
dealers and brokers, fund managers, lending investors, pension
funds, pawnshops and nonstock savings and loan associations.
Figure 5 shows the total assets of the Philippine financial system
from 1980 to 1997. The system has been consistently dominated by
banks in general, and commercial banks in particular. The growth
of commercial bank assets was significantly higher in the 1990s as a
result of the entry of new domestic and foreign banks, as well as
further increases in minimum capital requirements. On the other
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Figure 5. Assets of the Philippine financial system, by type of institution,
1980-97 (in billion pesos)
to just 15 percent m 1997. The government-owned social security
institutions, in particular, accounted for over half of the total assets
of this subsector.
Despite the rapid growth of the banking sector in terms of assets
and number of offices, financial deepening from 1980 to 1997 was
fairly modest. After stagnating for decades around the 20 percent
level prior to financial liberalization, the ratio of M2 to GDP rose to
around 26 percent in 1983. There was considerable financial
shallowing during the crisis period from 1984 to 1985, and a
substitution away from deposits into secure, higher yielding
government securities. Significant financial deepening occurred
beginning only in 1993, with the M2 to GDP ratio reaching 43 percent
in 1997. However, this should be interpreted with caution. In a
..... q'
comparative study of financial hberahzatlon m Aslan and Southern
Cone countries, Cho and Khatkhate (1989) found that to the extent
that short-term inflow of foreign savings is incorporated into this
ratio, an increase in this ratio cannot automatically be interpreted to
mean enhanced efficiency in mobilizing resources by drawing them
away from less productive uses.
Also, the Philippines' M2 to GDP ratio was still fairly low
compared to other countries in the region, and considering the robust82 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
state of the financial sector and the economy as a whole. This was
partly due to the tight liquidity management pursued by the BSP to
meet inflation targets set with the IMF. Also, high reserve
requirements and the 20 percent withholding tax on interest income
resulted in low rates Of return to deposits. Thus, there was a sharp
increase in off-balance sheet activities of commercial banks, which
was facilitated by the easing of banking regulations. These included
the use of foreign currency deposits (FCDUs) to extend foreign
currency loans, and trust accounts for securities investment,
especially in the 1990s (Table 3). For instance, the trust fund
operations of banks increased significantly from t213.5billion in 1980
to almost 12320billion in 1996, or an almost 200 percent growth in
real terms. Since trust accounts were not subject to the various
intermediation taxes until 1993, they were able to offer higher yields
relative to traditional bank deposits. Thus, if the trust operations of
banks were included in measuring financial deepening, since banks
were effectively using them in the same way and for the same
purpose as deposits and deposit substitutes, the ratio would reach
55 percent. While the development of trust accounts enabled banks
to tap additional sources of funds, they also drew a significant
portion of funds from deposit substitutes, and catered particularly
to large depositors (Lamberte 1993). Foreign currency deposits, on
the other hand, amounted to around 28 percent of traditional
deposits in 1996.
One of the criticisms leveled against the Philippine banking
system is its poor performance in savings mobilization. This was
partly attributed to the fixity of interest rates especially on savings
deposits. Tan (1989) cited the existence of market segmentation: small
savers who receive low (even negative) real deposit rates, and big
savers who have access to the money market and whose deposits
banks compete for. Thus, the large pool of low cost savings deposits
contributed to commercial banks' high profit margins. The danger
with persistently large negative real deposit rates is that they
misdirect savings (Dornbusch 1991). The problem of low domestic
savings needs to be addressed since the sustainability of economicMIL0"CONTAGION EFFECTS 83
Table 3. Selected liabilities of domestic commercial banks, 1980-96
Traditional deposits Deposit Trust FCDU
Total Distribution by type (%) substitutes accounts deposits
(billion _.) Demand Savings Time (% of total deposits) (bil US$)
1980 72.63 19 32 50 17 19
1985 143.02 10 39 50 6 18 1.86
1990 310.74 10 58 31 1 25 2,56
1991 365.61 11 58 31 1 37 3,16
1992 426.58 10 62 27 1 42 4.3,7
1993 556,80 10 65 25 0 33 5.61
1994 693,08 9 68 23 1 34 7.72
1995 873,83 9 67 24 1 30 9.12
1996 1,119,56 9 61 29 1 29 14,52
Source of basic data: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,
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Figure 6. Gross domestic saving and investment rates, 1990-96 (in % of GDP)
growth xsclosely linked to this. The major determinant of savings is
income, and income growth is dependent on the growth of
investments. On the other hand, low savings mobilization would
hinder investment growth, particularly in the private sector. Thus,
a policy gridlock could ensue (Yap and Reyes 1994). The savings-
investment gap (Figure 6) that resulted from low domestic savings84 [ JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
and high investment requirements was filled by private capital
inflows in the 1990s, as opposed to official flows in the previous
periods.
Another trend that arose in the 1990s was the significant increase
in the foreign liabilities of commercial banks, as the reforms resulted
in easier access to foreign funds. The total foreign exchange liabilities
of private commercial banks increased fro m around US$0.52 billion
in 1993, prior to the deregulation of foreign exchange transactions,
to more than U557 billion by the third quarter of 1997. When
expressed as a percentage of the total foreign exchange liabilities of
the country, it rose from around 1.5 percent to around 15.2 percent
for the same periods. Figure 7 shows the foreign assets and foreign
liabilities of commercial banks expressed as a percentage of GDP.
The gap between the two steadily increased from 1992 onwards,
but what is striking is the substantial increase in foreign liabilities
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Figure 7. Foreign assets, foreign liabilities, and total loan portfolio of
commercialbanks, 1990-96(in %of GDP)
This rapid increase in commercial banks' foreign liabilities
facilitated the lending boom in recent years. For instance, the
contribution of foreign currency loans to domestic lending of eight
commercial banks that resorted to th e international capital marketsMILO:CONTAGION EFFECTS] 85
was estimated at 12 percent in 1993, rising to 40 percent in the first
quarter of 1997. The increase in foreign liabilities is not necessarily
a problem. What ultimately matters is how the funds were used,
and this was the source of the concern in the case of the Philippines.
The distribution of FCDU loans, for instance, showed that while at
least 50 percent went to exporters, the share of nonexporters
increased from 4 percent at the start of 1994 to 30 percent by the
third quarter of 1997.
Table 4. Distribution of loans outstanding of commercial banks by industry,
1986-97 (in %)
Total Distribution by industry (%)
(billion P) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1986 88.3 15.9 8.4 25.0 2.1 4.2 15.7 3.5 17.7 2.5 5.0
1987 101.1 12.3 7.0 39.9 1.1 3.1 14.2 3.5 10.7 2.6 5.5
1988 126.6 10.7 5.4 42.2 0.8 1.7 17.7 3.8 8.9 2.8 5.8
1989 165"9 8,4 7.5 42.7 0.7 1.4 16.0 4.9 8.7 3.3 6.3
1990 199.6 8.2 8.4 42.8 0.5 2.2 17.7 3.8 7.9 4.0 4.5
1991 144.3 9.5 1.8 40.3 0.6 3.8 17.6 3.2 11.1 4.3 7.7
1992 256.3 9.6 5.6 37.3 0.9 2.4 20.3 3.8 10.6 3.7 5.8
1993 235.3 5.4 3.3 38.0 1.1 2.3 14-4 4.2 17.9 5.5 7.7
1996 1,203.7 4.1 0.9 26.5 2.2 3.8 16.3 5.2 23.8 8.0 9.1
1997 1,542.3 3.9 0.8 27.2 2.1 3.6 16.8 7.1 17.2 10.4 10.7
Note: 1-Agriculture, fishery and forestry; 2_Mining and quarrying; 3_Manufacturing;
4_Electricity, gas and water; 5_Construction; 6_Wholesale and retail trade; 7=Transport,
storage and communication; 8--Financing, insurance, business services; 9=Real estate;
and 10=Community, social and personal activities. No data were available for 1994-95.
Sou rce of basic data: Bangko Sen tral ng Pilipinas.
If one looks at the distribution of loans outstanding by
commercial banks according to industry (Table 4), the results show
that there was a significant drop in the share of agriculture (sector
1). The share of manufacturing (sector 3), on the other hand,
increased during the recovery years of the 1980s, but its share has
since consistently fallen as well. In fact, the share of manufacturing86 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
to total loans outstanding of commercial banks in 1996 reverted to
its pre-reform level. In contrast, the sectors that increased their share
were those in the services sector (sectors 6-10). The increase in the
share of transportation, storage and communication was due to the
liberalization of these sectors. What is noteworthy is the increase in
the share of consumer loans such as housing loans (sector 9), and
car loans and credit cards (sector 10).
More dramatic trends are revealed if one looks at the distribution
of loans granted by commercial banks according to industry from
1981 to 1997 (Table 5). The downward trend in the shares of
manufacturing and mining was also evident. On the other hand,
the downward trend in the share of agriculture from 1984 to 1993
was reversed in 1996. What is striking was the substantial increase
in the share of construction, in addition to the services-sector. The
growth in the amount of loanable funds that went to construction
and real estate between 1993 and 1996 led to the imposition of a 30
percent cap on commercial banks' total exposure to the property
sector in June 1997 by the BSP. The dominant share of financing,
insurance, and business services, on the other hand, was largely
accounted for by interbank loans. If this sector were excluded, the
same trends would still be evident. The overall trend in the loan
portfolio of commercial banks was thus worrisome because it had
serious repercussions on the viability and stability of the financial
sector, and the sustainability of the country's growth performance.
Finally, although there had been some lengthening of loan
maturities, loans outstanding of commercial banks were still
predominantly short-term (Figure 8).
On the other hand, the Philippine stock market became a more
important source of funds in recent years. Albeit starting from a
very small base, th e Philippine stock market grew very rapidly in
recent years and even outperformed all other markets in the region
in 1994. Figure 9 shows the volume of trading in the stock market
from 1975 to 1997. The private securities market was composed
mostly of gold and copper mining stocks prior to the 1970s. In the
1970s, there was a speculative boom in oil stocks (World Bank 1992).88 JOURNAL .OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
As a result of the political and economic turmoil in the early 1980s,
the market significantly contracted. Trading volume gradually
increased beginning in 1986 as confidence in the economy returned
following the change of the government. An increase was recorded
in 1989 due to the debt-equity swaps and the launching of four closed
end Philippine country funds. Thus, market capitalization grew from
more than 41 billion pesos in 1986 to more than 261 billion pesos in
1989, or a four-fold increase in real terms. As a ratio of GDP, it
increased from less than 7 percent in 1986 to more than 28 percent
in 1989. However, market capitalization was almost halved in 1990
as a result of various crises. Dramatic increases in trading volumes
were recorded beginning in 1993 with the liberalization of the capital
account, and the recovery of the economy. The privatization program
of the government also continued apace. Thus, total market
capitalization rose to 97 percent of GDP in 1996.
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Figure 9. Philippine stock market, 1975-97
There were 216 companies listed in the Philippine Stock
Exchange at the end of 1996, compared to 138 a decade ago. However,
only about 75 of that are actively traded, and the market is
concentrated in a number of shares. For instance, of the total marketMIL0"CONTAGION EFFECTS[ 89
capitalization of P1,355 billion in 1994, around 40 percent was
accounted for by six companies. The largest component is the
property sector, with residential and property developers accounting
for 23.1 percent of market capitalization at the end of 1995. The
consumer sector accounted for around 17.4 percent, although this
sector was largely dominated by the beverage corporation giant San
Miguel, the single largest stock on the equity market (with
capitalization at P122 billion at the end of 1995), which alone made
up 8.5 percent of the entire stock market's value. Conglomerates
accounted for 15.4 percent of the market, banking for 14 percent,
and utilities for 12.8 percent (BMI 1996).
As in the real sector, the Philippine financial sector was a lot
stronger in the 1990s compared to the 1980s. However, a number of
worrying trends were also beginning to emerge. In particular, the
years of significant net capital inflows were •associated with rapid
expansion in the banking sector's foreign currency liabilities,
deposits, and domestic lending. As a result of the rising proportion
of external debt intermediated through commercial banks, a
significant portion of which went into the nontradeable sector,
commercial banks became vulnerable to sudden movements in the
exchange rate.
Social development
Ultimately, the goal of economic policy is to maximize some
social welfare function. Thus, in assessing the growth episode of
the 1990s, its social impact needs to be considered as well.
Along with the various economic reforms that were deemed
necessary in transforming the Philippine economy to fnake it more
competitive and efficient, goals for human development and poverty
alleviation were also integrated in the Ramos administration's
development plan. Proposed policies to achieve the latter included:
(i) the promotion of sustained income and employment growth
among the poor; (ii) the provision of safety nets for displacements
due to structural adjustments; (iii) effective response to natural and
man-made calamities and disasters; and (iv) public resources and90 [ JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
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efforts directed toward basic social services, disadvantaged regions
and specific groups of the poor. Employment generation was seen
as the key to increasing incomes and alleviating poverty. The Social
Reform Agenda (SRA) was launched in 1994 as the government's
poverty alleviation and safety net program for specific geographical
areas and sectors. 5
The SRA represented the government's attempt to streamline
all direct anti-poverty programs under one package. It
operationalized the human development goals that were embodied
in the government's development plan. Its macro poverty reduction
target was to bring absolute poverty down from 39.9 percent in 1991
to 30 percent in 1998, when a new president would be elected. The
SRA centered on three major strategic interventions: (i) access to
basic social services as imperative for survival; (ii) asset reform and
access to economic opportunities as the means for employment and
income generation; and (iii) people's effective participation in
governance toward self-reliance and empowerment.
The SRA was initially formulated to•address the minimum basic•
needs of the priority provinces, which were identified in a series of
consultations between representatives from the different
government offices and mem/bers of the community in 1993-94. The
priority provinces were chosen based on poverty incidence, existence
• of armed conflict, isolation, and special development needs. Specific
target beneficiaries included farmers and landless agricultural
workers in agrarian reform communities; fisher folk in coastal
communities •inpriority bays and lakes; urban poor; workers in the
informal sector; and other disadvantaged groups such as women,
• children, youth, persons with disabilities, senior citizens, and victims
of disasters and natural calamities.
A key factor in the drawing up of the SRA was the participation
of the disadvantaged groups and nongovernmental organizations
SThe discussion on poverty alleviation and the SRA draws heavily on Reyes and del
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(NGOs) in the formulation of specific goals and projects.
Components of the SRA began to be installed in the priority
provinces in 1995, and its implementation began in 1996.
Acknowledging the different needs of the marginalized sectors,
the SRA constituted nine flagship programs that were to serve as its
core commitment to these sectors. It included flagship programs on
agricultural development; fisheries and aquatic management;
ancestral domains; socialized housing; comprehensive and
integrated delivery of social services (CIDSS); workers' welfare and
protection; livelihood; credit; and institution-building and effective
participation in governance.
Thus, poverty alleviation was not the sole concern of the SRA.
Convergence-the focusing and synchronization of the delivery of
programs and resources to priority areas and target groups-was
the major strategy for localizing the SRA. The institutional structure
designed to operationalize the SRA thus cut across the national,
regional, provincial, municipal and barangay levels, with basic sector
counterpart structures at each level. It also involved the
establishment of inter-organizational interfaces to facilitate
convergence. The overall governing body for the SRA is the Social
Reform Council (SRC).
To fund the SRA, the 1996 national budget was subjected to a
disaggregation process to identify public sector investments for the
SRA. That is, agency budgets wer e tested for their sensitivity to anti-
poverty and other social reform efforts. Of the total budget of 394.9
billion pesos, 86.7 billion pesos or 22 percent was found to be "SRA-
enrolled", that is, focused on specific commitments made to the basic
sectors under the SRA. Whether these investments actually benefited
the poor is another issue. The amount allocated for SRA-directed
activities in the 1997 national budget was lower both in absolute
and relative terms-85.6 billion pesos, or 19.7 percent of the total
budget. Thus, it was ironic that the 1997 budget was hailed as an
anti-poverty budget. In general, there were minimal increases in
the budget allocation for social services, which accounted for around
25 percent of total allocation from 1993 to 1997.92 [ JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
in addition to the national budget allocation, SRA programs were
funded by a Special purpose fund called the Poverty Alleviation
Fund (PAF). The PAF for 1996 amounted to 4 billion pesos. It was
intended to address the needs of priority areas where standard
government programs were inadequate, particularly in agricultural
development, CIDSS, and workers' welfare. Specific projects funded
by the PAF in 1996 included communal irrigation, scholarship
programs, hiring of teachers and purchase of school desks, and
reintegration assistance for returning overseas Filipino workers
(OFWs). The PAF appropriated for 1997 was specifically intended
for poverty alleviation programs in the two lowest municipal classes
in the priority provinces, and amounted to 2 billion pesos.
Overall, economic growth was accompanied by improvaments
in some social indicators. The :Philippines' Human Development
Index improved from 0.621 in 1992 to 0.677 in 1995 (UNDP 1998). 6
More specifically, gains were made in health, nutrition and education
as evidenced by increasing life expectancy and literacy rates, and
declining mortality and malnutrition rates. Overall, there was wider
access to health, nutrition and family planning services. Thus, the
general health condition of the population improved, with life
expectancy at birth increasing from 66.6 years in 1993 to 68 years in
1997. The infant mortality rate declined from 52 per 1,000 live births
in 1993 to 45.8 in 1997, while the crude death rate decreased from
6.9 per 1,000 population in 1993 to 6.1 in 1997. The total fertility rate
likewise declined from 4.2 percent in 1990 to 3.6 percent in 1997.
The nutrition status also improved, with the prevalence of
underweight preschool and school children declining from 10
percent and 9.4 percent in 1992, to 8.4 percent and 7.4 percent in
1996, respectively. The basic literacy rate likewise improved from
89.9 percent in 1989 to 93.9 in 1994, while the functional literacy rate
The Human Development Index measures a country's overall achievements in three basic
dimensions of human development- longevity, knowledge and a decent standard of living.
It is based on life expectancy at birth, educational attainment and real GDP per capita.MILO'CONTAGION EFFECTS [ 93
rose from 75.2to 83.8during the same time period. 7The participation
rate for both elementary and secondary levels also improved from
1993 to 1997. There was also some improvement in the bottom 30
percent of families' access to safe water, sanitary toilet facilities, and
electricity. The proportion of households with safe water supply
increased from 80.1percent in 1992to 86percent in 1996, while those
with sanitary toilet facilities rose from 69.5 percent to 74.4 percent
for the same period.
With respect to poverty alleviation, there was a decline in poverty
incidence from 39.9 percent of families in 1991 to 32.1 percent in
1997. In terms ofpercentage of the population, the poverty incidence
went down from 45.3 to 37.5 percent during the same period.
However, the decline primarily took place in Metro Manila, while
the situation in rural areas in particular only marginally improved
(Table 6).The subsistence incidence likewise went down from 20.4
to 16.5 percent of families, or from 24.3 to 20.4 percent of the total
population from 1991 to 1997. Again, subsistence levels were
significantly higher outside of Metro Manila, or in rural areas in
general. The latter measure refers to the proportion of families or
individuals who were unable to meet their basic food requirements,
or the core poor. In terms of magnitude, however, the downward
trend in the number of poor families from 1991to 1994was reversed
in 1997, when it went up from more than 4.531 million in 1994 to
more than 4.553 million in 1997 (Table 7).The number ofsubsistence
families also increased from almost 2.304 million families in 1994to
almost 2.337 million in 1997.
There was also adownward trend in the poverty gap ratio, which
measures the inadequacy of family income relative to the poverty
threshold, from 13 percent in 1991 and 11.2 percent in 1994, to 10
percent in 1997. That is, on average, poor families were better off in
Basic literacy refers to the ability to write a simple message in any language or dialect,
while functional literacy also includes numeracy and problem-solving skills.94 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
Table 6. Poverty incidence and subsistence incidence, 1985-97 (in %)
1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997
Pocerty incidence of families Poverty incidence of population
_ilippines 44.2 40.2 39.9 35.5 32.1 49.3 45.5 45.3 40.6 37.5
NCR 23.0 21.6 13.2 8.0 7.1 27.2 25.2 16.7 10.5 9.6
Outside of NCR 47.5 43.1 44.2 39.9 36.2 52.8 48.7 49.9 45.5 42.1
Urban 33.6 30.1 31.1 24.0 18.5 37.9 34.3 35.6 28.0 22.5
Rural 50.7 46.3 48.6 47.0 44.4 56,4 52.3 55,1- 53.1 51.2
Subsistence incidence of families Subsistence incidence of population
Philippines 24,4 20.3 20.4 18.1 16.5 28.5 24.3 24.3 21.8 20,4
NCR 6,0 5.0 2.1 0.7 0.8 7.1 6.3 2.8 1.0 1.0
Outside of NCR 27,2 22,7 23,3 20.8 19.0 31,9 27,2 27.8 25,1 23.5
Urban 15,2 12.1 14.3 10,4 7.2 17,8 14.4 17.0 12.8 9.3
Rural 30.0 25,3 26,4 25.6 24.8 35.2 30.4 31.7 30,8 30.4
Note: NCR stands for National Capital Region, or Metro Mmaila.
Source:National Statistical Coordination Board.
Table 7. Magnitude of poor families, 1985-97
1985 1988 1991 1994 1997
Philippines 4,355,052 4,230,484 4,780,865 4,531,170 4,553,387
NCR 301,973 310,284 217,602 141,671 140,793
Outside of NCR 4,053,079 3,920,200 4,563,263 4,389,499 4,412,594
Urban 1,250,398 1,198,555 1,847,579 1,521,882 1,246,173
Rural 3,104,655 3,031,929 2,933,286 3,009,288 3,307,215
Source:National Statistical Coordination Board.
1997 compared to the previous years. But again, the decline was
more pronounced in the NCR (from 2.9 to 1.2 percent) and urban
areas (from 10 to 5 percent), compared to the rural areas (from 16 toMILO:CONTAGION EFFECTS 95
Table 8. Distribution of total family income and average family income
by income,decile, 1991-97
Income share of families Average annual family Ave. annual
Decile (in %) income growth rate,
(in constant 1988 prices) 1991-97
1991 1994 1997 1991 1994 1997 (in %)
Philippines 100.0 100.0 100.0 42,886 42,800 51,790 3.2
First 1.8 1.9 1.7 7,853 8,040 8,621 1.6
Second 2.9 3.0 2.7 12,618 13,002 13,801 1.5
Third 3.8 3.9 3.4 16,251 16,839 17,783 1.5
Fourth 4.7 4.9 4.3 20,033 20,911 22,187 1.7
Fifth 5.7 6.0 5.3 24,481 25,630 27,676 2.1
Sixth 7.0 7.4 6.7 30,108 31,478 34,751 2.4
Seventh 8.8 9.1 8.6 37,555 39,062 44,715 3.0
Eigl_th 11.4 11.8 11.4 48,832 50,558 59,149 3.2
Ninth 16.1 16.4 16.1 69,041 70,363 83,648 3.3
Tenth 37.8 35.5 39.7 162,081 152,106 205,543 4.0
Source:Family Income and Expenditure Survey, National Statistics Office.
15.2 percent). Furthermore, income distribution worsened from 1991
to 1997, although it improved from 1991 to 1994 as the average annual
family income of the wealthiest decile declined while the rest
increased (Table 8). The widening gap between the poorest and
richest deciles is stark. If one looks at the distribution of income
over a longer time frame, the lack of improvement in income
distribution becomes even more evident (Figure 10). The richest 20
percent of families consistently accounted for over half of total
income from 1985 to 1997, with the Gini coefficient at its worst in
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there had been no visible increase in the share of social services
expenditures in the national budget from 1993 to 1997; and
* Poverty is also a function of factors other than the direct
intervention programs. Economy-wide and sectoral policies have
agreaterimpact on the situation ofthe poor. Thus, itwas difficult
to say to what degree poverty reduction could be accounted for
by direct interventions vis-a-vis the indirect programs.
The government's profession of good intentions,
notwithstanding, the amount allocated forpoverty alleviation would
seem to belie its true importance. In fact, PAF allocations were
consistently halved from P4 billion in 1996to P2 billion in 1997. The
original allocation for 1998 was P1 billion, although this was later
increased to P2.5 billion. Itwas estimated that, for the government
to have achieved itspoverty incidence reduction target of30percent
of families by 1998, it needed to have additionally spent an average
of P9.6 billion annually from 1994 to 1998. As it is, the P6 billion
total allocation for 1996-97 was estimated to be capable of reducing
poverty incidence by only 1.1 percent in each year (cited in Reyes
and del Valle 1998). Hence, the need for government to ensure that
future PAFs would be substantial enough to have a strong impact,
especially given the magnitude of the problem.
One estimate of the amount needed to eradicate poverty
completely was P86.2 billion annually, which represented the
estimated value of insufficiency of poor families. The enormity of
this amount indicated that direct provision of income transfers was
not a feasible option for the government. Instead, the government
still needed to focus on programs that would enable the poor to
earn income on a sustained basis. In particular, the focus should
stilI be on broad based economic growth to generate gainful
employment and livelihood opportunities. There should also be the
continued and much improved provision of basic social services,
which had proven effective in alleviating poverty in the past.
Programs that improve the poor's access to quality education and
primary health care, in particular, were effective towards equalizing98 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
human capital. Finally, there was still the need for social safety nets
to assist the poor during the transition period. However, these should
be targeted programs appropriately designed to minimize leakages
(Reyes and del Valle 1998).
In a comprehensive study of poverty in the Philippines up to
the early 1990, de Dios (1993) cited the following reasons for poverty:
(i) failure of growth and the lack of employment opportunities; (i)
declining productivity; (ii) high population growth; (iii) inequality
of incomes; and (iv) inadequate provision of social services. Clearly,
these reasons continued to hold in the 1990s.
Simply put, poverty remained high in the Philippines because
of the economy's failure to grow rapidly enough, sustain that growth,
and generate employment. Growth was also lopsided, which
consequently resulted in significantly higher poverty reduction in
the urban/capital cities vis-a-vis the ruralareas. The failure of past
growth was attributed to the failure, in the long run, to restructure
the economy to make it externally more competitive and allow
broader participation by the people. That is, the character or quality
of growth is just as important as its magnitude (de Dios 1993). The
reforms instituted in the 1990s were precisely directed toward those
objectives. Adjustments in the right direction were being made, such
as the reported improvements in the efficiency and competitiveness
of the manufacturing sector as a result of the trade reforms. But
overall, change in the structure of the trade sector was slow in
coming. MedaUa (1998) noted that relatively more investments were
going into nontradeable sectors rather than exportable sectors, which
could have serious repercussions in the medium term, especially in
the context of a growing trade deficit. Overall, production and
investment patterns were still not optimal for growth, and one source
of distortion was the overvalued currency prior to the currency crisis
in 1997 (Medalla 1998).
There was also the continuous decline of productivity,
particularly in the agricultural sector, which remains the primary
source of income for most of the poor. Another reason for poverty
that continued to hold in the 1990s was the inequality of incomes.MILO: CONTAGION EFFECTS[ 99
Rapid and sustained economic growth would significantly
contribute to poverty alleviation. The speed at which it does,
however, would depend on whether the benefits from growth are
equally distributed (de Dios 1993). However, as was seen earlier,
this was not the case in the Philippines even in the 1990s. Thus,
poverty remained high, not only because growth was not sustained,
but also because of the uneven distribution of the benefits that were
generated.
Finally, there was the inadequate provision of social services,
which directly contributes to the poor's low productivity and is an
important tool for income redistribution (de Dios 1993). The fiscal
crises in the past put severe pressure on budgets for social services.
But with the government's surplus positions in the 1990s, this should
have been less of a problem. In fact, there was no appreciable increase
in budgetary allocations for social services. This was compounded
by low levels of capital expenditures, which constrained the
economy's overall growth capacity.
In principle, the government's poverty alleviation strategy
involved raising both the poor's private income (i.e., income from
productive assets they own, including from employment) and public
income (i.e., income derived from the state via social production of
free or subsidized goods and services and income transfers). In
practice, it relied heavily on the former. However, the quality of
growth overall was not socially optimizing, in terms of providing
sustained employment and improving income distribution across
regions and income groups. Simply put, the means chosen to
alleviate poverty had proven inadequate. Also, despite the
comprehensive approach to poverty alleviation, the social impact
of macroeconomic and sectoral policies were still not fully
understood and accounted for. Although various social safety nets
were in place to help mitigate any adverse impact of policy on
specific sectors of the population, overall, they were poorly designed
and implemented.100 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
IMPACT OF AND POLICY RESPONSES TO THE
ASIAN CRISIS
Immediate impact and policy responses
Thailand's property and financial crises broke out in April 1997,
which led to the pullout of foreign investments from their stock
market. This, coupled with its widening current account deficit, put
tremendous pressure on the baht. The Bank of Thailand finally
devalued the baht in July, its first devaluation in 14 years. Speculators
then began to prey on the other currencies in the region-initially,
the Malaysian ringgit, the Philippine peso, the Indonesian rupiah
and the Singaporean dollar, and later the Hong Kong dollar and the
Korean won. In general, the combination of contagion effects from
Thailand, overvalued currencies, vulnerable capital inflows, and
increased uncertainty fomented the regional currency crisis
(Magdaluyo 1998).
The BSP's initial response to the speculative attack on the peso
was to raise its key overnight borrowing rate from 11.25 percent in
May to 20 percent in June,and 32 percent in mid-July, in order to
penalize speculators and discourage the conversion of peso holdings
into US dollars. The BSP then began to heavily intervene in the
foreign exchange market in early July to keep the exchange rate stable
around the P26/US$1 mark. Finally, the BSP allowed the peso to
depreciate in mid-July, after spending around US$1.5 billion in its
defense. The exchange rate subsequently breached the P30/US$1
mark in August, reaching more than P45/US$1 in early 1998. Tile
BSP then successively lowered its overnight borrowing rate to 20
percent at the end of July to 14 percent in August, and 12 percent in
October.
In addition to widening the trading band of the peso, the BSP
also tightened some foreign exchange controls. It placed a cap of
US$100,000 on over-the-counter sales of foreign exchange for non-
trade purposes, which was further lowered to US$25,000 at the end
of July. This ceiling was partially lifted for residents in September.
It also imposed a limit on commercial banks' oversold position ofMILO:CONTAGION EFFECTS[101
10 percent of unimpaired capital, while their overbought position
was set at 20 percent, with penalties and sanctions imposed on banks
that exceed the allowable positions. The limits were later reversed,
and the overbought position of banks was even lowered to 5 percent,
but not to exceed US$10 million, to force commercial banks to off-
load their foreign exchange holdings. To further stabilize the foreign
exchange market, the BSP and the Bankers Association of the
Philippines (BAP) entered into an agreement in December to set
daily quotas for the supply of dollars to be sold at an agreed rate,
and for the BSP to provide forward cover to banks that had
nondeliverable forward contracts withunhedged dollar borrowers.
Finally, the BSP increased reserve requirements on deposits,
deposit substitutes, common trust funds, and other trust and
fiduciary accounts of banks. In addition to a 13 percent statutory
reserve, the BSP imposed an additional 3 percent liquidity reserve,
that is, funds required to be placed in short-term market yielding
instruments. This was raised consecutively until it reached 8 percent
in August, to siphon off excess peso liquidity in the system and
limit banks' dollar purchases.
The BSP's tight monetary policy to defend the exchange rate led
to a sharp increase in domestic interest rates (Figure 11). From a low
of 10 percent in April 1997, the bellwether 91-day Treasury bill rate
rose to 19.1 percent in January 1998, while the average lending rate
went up to more than 20 percent in the last quarter of 1997 from less
than 13 percent in April 1997. Overall, however, tight monetary
policy failed to arrest the depreciation of the peso. But in contrast to
previous episodes of peso devaluations, the inflation rate was fairly
steady during the first six months of the crisis. This was due to the
relative stability of food prices. Also, domestic manufacturers chose
to run down their inventories and deferred price increases to be
able to compete with cheap imports, whose entry was facilitated by
the more liberalized trade environment.1021 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
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Figure 11. Trends in the exchange rate, interest rates and inflation rate,
Jan. 1997-0ct. 1999
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Figure 12. Philippine stock market composite price index (Phisix) and
total volume turnover, Jan. 1987-Oct. 1999
Impact on the financial sector
Figure 12 shows the monthly movement of the Philippine stock
exchange's composite price index (Phisix) and total value turnover
from 1987 to 1999. It indicates increased volatility in the stock market
from 1993 as a result of the opening up of the capital account. As inMILO :CONTAGION EFFECTS 1103
the other bourses in the region, stock market prices plunged as the
domestic currency reached record lows against the US dollar and
foreign investors divested of their holdings. From a high of 3,171
points at the end of 1996, the Phisix fell to 1,772 points by November
1997,which was just slightly higher than its pre-boom level. Banking
and property stocks were the worst hit. The thinness of the stock
market and the surge in portfolio capital inflows made it highly
vulnerable to shifts in international capital as well as the domestic
and international environments.
In contrast to Thailand, Indonesia and Korea, there was no
systemic failure of financial institutions in the Philippines. Only one
fairly small, newly upgraded commercial bank-Orient Bank-
failed in the immediate aftermath of the currency crisis. As in
previous cases ofbank failures, insider abuse was the ultimate cause
of the bank's failure. Of its reported P6.1 billion worth of non-
performing loans, around P5.7billion directly or indirectly benefited
its owner. In particular, there was excessive lending to the real estate
sector, primarily to companies associated with the owner of the bank,
who also tapped other commercial banks and the stock market to
finance his property acquisitions. He was reported to have amassed
more than P22 billion in loans from a total of 30creditor banks. The
currency depreciation, the stock market crash, soaring domestic
interest rates, and the property sector bust led to the collapse of his
real estate ventures. In addition to Orient Bank, six thrift banks and
15 rural banks closed in 1998.
The adverse effect of the crisis on banks became evident in the
volume of nonperforming loam, or loans that missed debt payments
for three consecutive months, relative to total loans of commercial
banks. Prior to the crisis, commercial banks' nonperforming loans
accounted for just less than 3.4 percent of total loans. The sudden
depreciation of the peso plus the up tick in interest rates, and the
weakening of the economy with the characteristic drop in the levels
of production and consumer demand, rising unemployment, and
low business confidence, impaired the ability ofboth corporate and
individual borrowers to service their debts. As a result,104 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
nonperforming loans rose to 4.7 percent of total loans at the end of
1997, to 10.4percent at the end of 1998, and climbed even further to
14.4 percent in the third quarter of 1999. The ratio appears to have
peaked or be nearing its peak. Companies that borrowed in dollars
Werehard hit when their debts nearly doubled as the peso fell steeply
against the dollar. On the other hand, businesses with peso
denominated loans suffered as interest rates shot up to as high as 30 i
percent.
Commercial banks' total loans, and consequently total assets,
fell following the write-offs and provisioning for bad loans (see Table
9). The alarming growth of past due loans and loan loss provisions
Table 9. Selected data on commercial banks, 1997-99
Year Total assets Total loau'ts Nonperforming Loan loss
(billion pesos) (billion pesos) lomas (% of total provision (% of
loans) total loans)
1997
Mar 2,005.00 1,284.59 3.29 1.32
Jun 2,085.60 1,418.95 3.37 1.30
Sept 2,31'0.70 1_499.25 3.96 1.44
Dec 2,513.00 i,573.15 4.68 2.21
1998
Mar 2,417.00 1,517.63 7.42 2.59
Jun 2,535.90 1,595.3_ 8.95 2.74
Sept 2,529.00 1,586.25 11.04 3.10
Dec 2,528.00 1,542.49 10.37 3.98
1999
Mar 2,508.30 1,484.46 13.18 4.56
Jun 2'583.10 1,505.60 13.10 4.75
Aug 2,546.90l 1,504.44 14.36 5.10
Note: IAs ofJuly 1999.
Soura,: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.MILO:CONTAGION EFFECTS[105
caused banks to be overly cautious in their lending in 1998-99. The
contraction in outstanding loans of commercial banks until the first
quarter of 1999 was a dramatic reversal of the 41 percent loan growth
seen in 1996. Loan growth significantly slowed down to 4.9 percent
in 1997, and contracted by 2.2 percent in 1998.
While the increase in nonperforming loans has moderated in
recent months, other components of commercial banks'
nonperforming assets continued to grow. In particular, commercial
banks' exposure to the property sector was reflected in the increase
in their real and other properties owned• or acquired (ROPOA).
ROPOA assets increased from around 14.56 billion pesos prior to
the crisis to more than 82.9 billion pesos at the end of the third quarter
of 1999.
The decline in lending, in turn, inevitably became a drag on
commercial banks' profitability, which went down although it
remained positive. Return on equity fell from 16.3 percent in 1996
to 12.4 percent in 1997, and 6.6 percent in 1998. With lendingactivities
down, banks were forced to concentrate on their other sources of
income such as fees and charges, foreign exchange trading, and other
investments. The 1998 data show that investments of banks grew
by 47.6 percent to 1.2 trillion pesos from the 1997 figures, as banks
shifted to holding government securities such as Treasury bills
instead. Thus, much of the money that fueled the 1999 first quarter's
• 2 percent growth in real GNP came from pump priming and
remittances.
To mitigate the impact of the sharp depreciation of the peso and
the deterioration in banks' assets, the BSP mandated increases in
the minimum capital requirements for banks over the period 1998-
2000. For instance, the required minimum capital for universal banks
was raised from 3.5 billion pesos prior to the crisis, to 4.5 billion
pesos in 1998, 4.95 billion pesos in 1999 and 5.4 billion pesos in 2000.
For commercial banks, the increase in minimum capital requirement
was from 1.625 billion pesos to 2.8 billion pesos in 2000, while there
was a doubling of minimum Capital requirement for thrift banks
located in Metro Manila from 200 million pesos to 400 million pesos.106 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
The BSP likewise instituted stiff penalties for failure to comply with
the new minimum capital requirements. As a result, there has been
a rise in merger and acquisition activities especially in 1999, which
could lead to a restructuring of the banking system (Lamberte and
Yap 1999).
Despite the crisis' negative impact, the Philippine banking sector
still fared relatively well compared to the crisis economies,
particularly of Thailand and Indonesia. This was attributed to the
reforms that had been implemented, as well as the period of
adjustment that occurred in the 1980s that saw the weeding out of i[
weak banks and the institution of stronger prudential regulation.
The implication is that the supposed benefits of the financial sector
reforms were actualized. This was true to a certain extent. In
particular, banks were better capitalized, with the capital adequacy
ratio ranging between 17 and 20 percent from 1992 to June 1997.
However, the emergence of similar trends in the lending behavior
and foreign liabilities of commercial banks raise the question of
whether the efficiency gains from financial liberalization in particular
were realized. Overall, the answer would seem to be no, and this
could be attributed both to commercial bank behavior and the
monetary authorities' policystance (Milo 1998).
Doubtless the banks' imprudence contributed to their problems,
as they became very lenient in their lending activities. The rapid
buildup in resources and the increasing number of players fostered
a more competitive lending environment. Thus, banks tended to
relax credit evaluation procedures. There was also the emphasis on
collateral as the basis for granting a loan, instead of cash flows for
instance. Hence, the penchant for real estate, which was traditionally
seen as sound investment and collateral. On the other hand, there
was the policy stance of the BSP, which reinforced the banks' false
sense of security, in particular, prior to the crisis, monetary
authorities in the Philippines gave a strong signal that the level of
the exchange rate was not only appropriate, but would be
maintained for an extended period of time. This stance led to the
underpricing of foreign exchange risk, which encouraged foreignMILO: CONTAGION EFFECTS]107
borrowing and dollar denominated lending, and discouraged the
development of a forward market. The underpricing of risk, plus
the BSP's implicit policy of ensuring that no commercial banks would
fail, would necessarily be allocationally inefficient since it would
lead the financial system towards excessive exposure to high-risk
activities, such as the property sector and the stock market.
Fortunately, such worrying trends were fairly recent and had not
yet the reached the same proportions as those in the crisis economies.
Hence, the muted effect of the regional crisis on the Philippine
financial sector.
Income and employment effects
The growth momentum from 1994 to 1996 was sustained during
the first six months of the Asian crisis, although there was a
deceleration in the growth of GDP (Table 10). Growth of gross capital
formation even accelerated, as ongoing and planned investment
activities were completed. Exports also continued to perform well.
On the other hand, the slowdown in construction became evident
in the last quarter of 1997. The impact of the crisis on the economy
became more evident in 1998, particularly in the construction and
manufacturing sectors. This was compounded by the poor
performance of agriculture as a result of adverse weather conditions.
The latter also resulted in higher inflation rates, which again reached
double-digit levels by the end of 1998.
On the demand side, gross capital formation declined as high
interest rates, tight financing, and the uncertain economic
environment discouraged investment spending. Merchandise
exports continued to grow, albeit at a substantially decelerated rate
in 1998, while merchandise imports significantly declined. Total
exports, however, declined as exports of nonfactor services such as
tourism fell. The nominal peso depreciation led to a significant
adjustment in the real effective exchange rate, which depreciated
by 30 percent from June 1997 to February 1998. The real depreciation
effectively wiped out the real appreciation of the peso during thei,,,,,,a
oo
Table 10. Growth of real GDP by expenditure share and industrial origin, and other macroeconomic indicators,
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 :2:
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 O
Growth o_ real GNP 4.6 4.9 73 5.4 5.3 5.1 5.1 1.5 -0.5 0.7 -1.2 2.1 3.8 33 "_
Growth of real GDP 4.4 4.7 5.9 5.5 5.6 4.9 4.7 1.1 -1.0 -0.1 -2.0 1.2 3.6 3.1
"El
Pememall consm_lion 3.7 3.8 4.6 5.0 5.1 5.0 4.9 4.5 3.9 Z9 Z6 Z5 2.6 Z6
Govenmmnt consumptkm 6.1 5,6 4.1 4.5 73 6.2 0,4 -5.4 -2-4 -1.3 0.6 7.6 6-2 3,7
Gax_ capital fonmation 9.0 3.7 13.3 14.9 7.1 9.3 15.0 -6.0 -18.2 -19.1 -22.3 -9.7 6.2 -53 t'_
Memhandise exports 15.2 16.2 9.6 8.6 15.2 15.0 14.8 10.6 -1.4 3.9 -14.4 0.7 3.0 8.0
Merchandise imports 15.6 16.0 16.9 3.0 2.7 10.2 15.0 -2.3 -12.1 -13.1 -33.9 -16.7 2.4 1.9 O
"o
Growth byi_xtustriai origin rn Z
Agriculbar_ fishery & 5.4 1.2 3.9 4.9 1.8 0.4 4.1 -3.8 -11.5 -3.1 -7.8 2_9 11.1 5.6 ,--]
Forestry
Industry 5.8 6.8 6.4 5.1 7.6 6.4 5.6 0.2 -0.7 -2.0 .-4.7 -2.2 -0.7 0.2
Mara_faeturing 5.0 6.8 5.6 2.3 5.3 4.3 4.7 2.0 -0.9 -1.5 -3.5 -1.0 0.9 2.2
C.tmslruction 9.4 6.6 10.9 21.3 18.5 18.1 7.6 -12.8 -5.1 -7.5 -8.5 -6.0 -5.3 -5.9
Services 4.3 5.0 6.4 6:2 5.8 5.5 4.4 4.5 3.6 2.8 3.2 3.0 4.0 4.4
Inflation rate 83 8.0 9.1 53 53 5.9 7.3 7.9 9.9 10.4 10.6 10.0 6.8 5.6
Trade bal_ (% of GDP) -12.2 -12_1 -13.7 -13.7 -12-6 -15.5 -12.2 -7.2 -1.6 3.3 43 3.1 0.8 ...
Natq gov't deficit (% of GDP) 1.0 0.6 03 -0.1 0.8 0.1 -0.4 -1.9 -1.9 -0.3 -3.2 -4.9 -2.6 -4.8
Smwce of basic dat.: National Statistical Coordination Board.MILO"CONTAGION EFFECTS]109
1990s, and thereby helped improvethe international competitiveness
of Philippine exports especially of labor intensive manufactures
(Intal et al. 1998). However, the credit crunch prevented exporters
from taking full advantage of the more favorable exchange rate. The
contraction in domestic output was tempered by the inflow of
overseas workers' remittances, although the latter also declined from
US$5.7 billion in 1997 to US$4.1 billion in 1998.
The slowdown in the economy was strongly reflected in the
unemployment rate, which rose to 9.6 percent in the third quarter
of 1998, from 7.4 percent two years earlier (Figure 13). This translated
to more than 3 million unemployed persons out of a labor force of
almost 31.3 million in 1998, compared to almost 2.2 million
unemployed in 1996. The number of firms and workers directly
affected by the worsening economic conditions more than doubled
from 1997 to 1998 (Table 11). Again, worst hit were those in the
construction, manufacturing and services sectors (Table 12), which
spearheaded growth in the 1990s. In addition to the jobs that were
lost as a result of the crisis, the slowdown in economic activity
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Figure 13. Unemployment rate, first quarter 1997-third quarter 1999 (in %)Table U. Number of firms that closed or retrenched due to economic reasons and the number of workers affected, I996-99
No. of _irms reporl_g: No. Of workers affected
0
Year Total Closure Retrench- Rotation, Total Permanent. Temporary Rotation, etc.
merit etc. layoff layoff _.
1996 1,079 347 724 39 80,701 47,008 29,487 4,206 O
1 _ sere 614 146 455 20 40,323 22,631 15,915 • 1,777 'x_
2na sem 599 211 372 23 40,378 __,...,_a__'7. : "' 13,572 "_""_
*---,i
Z
1997 1,155 338 804 48 62,724 39,176 19,843 3,705 t'_
1_ sere 580 180 381 26 33,115 21,463 9,773 1,879.
2.a sere 683 163 508 25 29,609 17,713 10,070 O 1,826 "O
Z
1998 3,072 642 2,310 293 155,198 76,726 50,744 27,728
Ia sem 1,936 403 1,420 172 83,852 39,923 29,442 14,487
2_ sere 1.725 254 1,378 169 71,346 36,803 21,302 13241
Aug 1999 2,107 257 1,341 521 _ 108,238 45,238 34,167 28,833
Note: Permanent layoffmcons complete and total separation _om employment; temporary layoffmeaos separation of workers for not more
than six months; rotation, etc. means rotation of work, reduced working time. Numbers may not add up due to multiple repotting.
_lncledes ftrms tlmt relmrted tempormy layoffs.
Smn'4_: Bureau of Label and EmploYment Statistics, Department of LaboLMIL0-CONTAGION EFFECTS1111
Table 12. Number of firms that closed or retrenched due to economic reasons
by industry, 1996-99
Industry 1996 1997 1998 Aug
1999
All industries 1,077 1,155 3,072 1,5861
Agriculture, fishery and forestry 97 70 95 44
Industry 545 568 1,254 565
Mining and quarrying 14 23 48 7
Manufacturing 508 505 1,025 479
Construction 21 31 173 72
Electricity, gas and water 2 9 8 7
Services 435 517 1,723 977
Transporation, colrununication and storage 68 91 257 142
Wholesale and retail trade 134 167 600 339
Financing, insurance, and business services 93 130 491 306
Community, social and personal services 140 129 375 95
Firms located in National Capital Region 610 575 1,708 1,284
(NCR)
Firms located outside of NCR 467 580 1,364 823
Note: 1Excludes 521 firms that reported temporary layoffs, rotation, etc,
Som'ce:Bureau of Labor and Employment Statistics, Depar_ent of Labor,
With the economic slowdown and rise in unemployment,
average family incomes, except those belonging to the richest decile,
expectedly declined (Table 13). The poor performance of the
agricultural sector due to adverse weather conditions further
worsened the poor's situation, who lived predominantly in the rural
areas. The rate of decline in average family income was regressive,
with families belonging to the poorest decile suffering the highest112 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
decline of more than 29 percent. Income distribution consequently
worsened in 1998.
The increase in average family income of the richest decile could
be due to windfalls from the crisis. Only the top 3 deciles increased
their savings from 1994 to 1997 in real terms, with the richest decile
registering the highest growth and share (Figure 14). This decile
also had access to a wider range of saving instruments, such as peso
and dollar deposits, trust accounts, and treasury bills. Thus, families
belonging to the top decfle were well-placed to benefit from increases
in interest rates and the depreciation of the peso as a result of the
financial crisis. In contrast, savings deposit, which carried low/and
static interest rates, was practically the only financial asset available
to small savers.
Table 13. Change in average family income by income decile, 1997-98
(in current prices)
Income decile 1997 FIES 1998 APIS % change % Distribution of total
family income
1997 FIES 1998 APIS
Philippines 123,000 121,438 -1.3 100.0 100.0
First 20,659 14,644 -29.1 1.7 1,2
Second 33,064 26,852 -18.8 2.7 2.2
Third 42,611 36,689 -13.9 3.5 3.0
Fourth 53,101 47,211 -11.1 4.3 3.9
Fifth 66,291 60,176 -9.2 5.4 5.0
Sixth 83,224 76,641 -7.9 6.8 6.3
Seventh 106,919 100,170 -6.3 8.7 8.2
Eighth 141,394 135,051 -4.5 11.5 11.1
Ninth 199,891 196,018 -1.9 16.3 16,1
Tenth 482,927 520,928 7.9 39.3 42.9
Note: FIES stands for Family Income and Expenditure Survey; APIS stands for Annual
Poverty Indicator Survey. These two surveys are comparable since they had the same
household samples, although the former is a lot more extensive. The APIS was started
only in 1998.
•"So,roe: National Statistics Office.MILO'CONTAGION EFFECTS 113
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Figure14. Average family income and savings by income decile, 1994and
1997(in constant1988prices)
Impact on the poor
In considering the social impact of the contagion effects of the
Asian crisis on the poor, one has to consider that they took place
simultaneously with the weakening of the agriculture sector due to
adverse weather patterns. This sector accounts for more than 40
percent of total employment. Thus, the decline in this sector would
have served to reinforce the adverse impact of the Asian crisis on
production, employment and income, and contributed significantly
to the increase in inflation rates.
In October 1998, the National Statistics Office conducted an
Annual Poverty Indicator Survey to supplement its triennial Family
Income and Expenditure Survey. The results on the impact of the
financial crisis on Filipino families showed that, of the projected
13.5 million families, 96.6 percent were affected by higher prices of
food and other basic commodities as a result of the financial crisis.
This was also due to adverse weather conditions. More than 20
percent reported loss of job within the country, while around 17
percent reported a reduction in wages. Less than 5 percent of total
families reported job loss of a migrant worker. In addition to the
financial crisis, more than 76 percent of families belonging to the
poorest 40 percent cited the drought or the El Nillo effect as their
second most serious problem (Table 14).114 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Table 14. Impact of the financial crisis on Filipino families
Projected no. Percentage of families affected by:
income strata of families Higher Job loss Reduced Drought
prices Local Migrant wages
Philippines 13,487,569 96.6 20.3 4.9 17.0 62.9
Lowest 40% 5,495,298 95,7 17.9 3.7 15.2 76.0
Highest 60% 7,992,270 97.0 22.0 5.9 18.4 54.0
Source:Annual Poverty Indicator Survey 1999, National Statistics Office.
Table 15. Filipino families' responses to problems clue to the financial crisis
Percentage of families reporting:
Income strafa Change Took Member Received Received Increased Other
in eating children migrated t assistance assistance working steps
pattern out of the city/ from from gov't hours taken
school another family/
country friends
Philippines 47,9 6.9 5.2 16.2 6.9 28.8 9.9
Lowest 40% 51.4 7.5 6.1 18.5 9.7 31.5 10.0
Highest 60% 45.5 6.4 4.6 14.7 5.0 27.0 9.9
Source:Annual Poverty Indicator Survey 1999, National Statistics Office,
Table 15 shows the various responses ofFilipino families to cope
with the problems brought about by the financial crisis. Almost 50
percent of the total families surveyed reported a change in their
eating pattern; around 29 percent increased their working hours;
almost 7 percent took their children out of school; more than 5
percent reported a family member migrating to the city or another
country; more than 16percent received assistance from relatives or
friends, while only less than 7 percent received assistance from the
government. Figures for the lowest 40percent income brackets were
a few percentage points higher. Considering that those belonging
to the poorest income brackets already have lower nutrition status
and school attendance rates, further declines would have grave
consequences,MILO:CONTAGION EFFECTS [115
Minimum daily wage earners were among the hardest hit, since
the minimum daily wage rate only rose slightly. In Metro Manila, it
increased from 185 pesos prior to the crisis to 198 pesos in February
1999, which is less than half of the estimated daily cost of living of
441 pesos for a family of six. Thus, it is almost certain that the small
gains made on poverty alleviation in the 1990s are in the process of
being nullified as a result of the Asian crisis. The ADB, for instance,
foresees that poverty incidence in the Philippines will grow by 5
percentage points from 32.3 in 1997. The various human
development indicators are thus expected to take a turn for the worse
(Reyes 1998).
The surge in interest rates had an adverse effect on the
government's fiscal position as it significantly raised the
government's interest payments. Furthermore, the decline in imports
and the slowdown in economic activity led to shortfalls in revenue
collection. Thus, from a minimal surplus in the first half of 1997, the
government posted a deficit of 2.3 billion pesos in the second half of
1997. This further grew to 50 billion pesos in 1998. To contain the
deficit, the government imposed a mandatory 25 percent reserve
requirement on all expenditures other than personnel and debt
service and a 10 percent deferment in the internal revenue allotment
for local government units. In addition, all tax subsidies of all
government agencies and corporations were suspended. The social
services sectors were eventually exempted from the mandatory
reserves in July 1998. Expenditures on social services fell by around
10 percent relative to the programmed levels in 1998 in contrast to
economic services, for instance, which fell by 30 percent. Although
this reduction was less than the reduction in other sectors, it has
serious repercussions on the poor, especially given the government's
historical underinvestment in the health and education sectors.
Decreases in capital outlays, and maintenance and other operating
expenditures will also have a direct negative impact on growth and
the quality of capital stock (Pineda 1999).116 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
Policies towards economic recovery
To date, the worst of the crisis seems to be over, and even the
crisis economies are deemed to be on the (long) road to recovery.
True to earlier prediction, the Philippines was among the first to
recover, posting a positive growth rate in the first quarter of 1999
along with Singapore and South Korea. However, first quarter
growth was attributed primarily to the recovery of agriculture, which
in turn was due to improved weather conditions, and government
pump-priming. The question is, how far can the economy's recovery
go with the continued weak performance of the industrial sector.
The latter, in turn, was attributed to continued weak consumer
demand, tight credit conditions, and the uncertain economic and
political environment.
To avert the economic slowdown, the government shifted to
pump priming in 1999 to take up the slack in private sector spending.
The government resorted to foreign borrowings to finance this
pump-priming strategy and the resulting deficit, which was
programmed at 68.4 billion pesos. It secured US$3 billion worth of
external financing to cover its programmed 1999 budget deficit. The
amount consisted of borrowings from ODA facilities, as well as bond
flotations in the international capital market. It began the year with
a US$1 billion two-part global fund, which was further increased
by US$200 million. This was followed in March 1999 by a 350-miUion
Euro bond, which was Asia's first overseas bond venture in the single
European currency. By shifting the government's source of financing
from local to foreign creditors, the government sought to lower
domestic interest rates and avoid crowding out the private sector.
Thus, the benchmark 91-day Treasury bill rate followed a declining
trend from a peak of more than 19 percent at the start of 1998 to
reach a 5-year low of less than 9 percent in October 1999, which was
even lower than its pre-crisis leve!of 10.5 percent.
The government's foreign borrowings also beefed up the .
country's gross international reserves, which rose from a low of
US$8.5 billion dollars at the start of 1998 (equivalent to less than
two months worth of imports) to almost US$14.5 billion as of end-MIL0: CONTAGION EFFECTS[117
September1999 (more than four months' worth of imports). Thus,
the exchange rate has appreciated and stabilized around the 38-39
pesos per US dollar mark. The resumption of foreign investment
inflows also contributed to the strengthening of the peso, as well as
the stock market. While foreign borrowings helped stabilize the peso
and lower domestic interest rates, the government was also criticized
for allowing the country's foreign debt to surge.
Monetary policy was likewise eased, with the successive
lowering of the BSP's overnight borrowing and lending rates to 8.75
percent and 11 percent, respectively, as of November 1999, compared
to 13.375 percent and 15.375 percent at the start of the year. The
sustained reduction in interest rates was made possible by the
downward trend in inflation rates, which began to decelerate from
11.5 percent in January to 5.4 percent in October 1999. The BSP also
cited its overperformance relative to monetary ceilings set with the
IMF. In addition to interest rate cuts, the BSP reduced total reserve
requirements on banks from 17 to 15 percent. However, the reduction
was on liquid reserves, i.e., funds that can be placed in government
securities and carry market rates, rather than the statutory reserve
•requirement that stood at 10 percent. The BSP pays only 4.5 percent
on 40 percent of the funds placed in its vault.
Banks' lending rates likewise followed a declining trend.
However, as noted in the previous section, commercial bank lending
continued to contract in the first quarter of 1999. This was due to
weak private sector demand, and the banks' cautious stance. The
easing of monetary policy, particularly the reduction in liquid reserve
requirement, had little impact on banks' lending behavior•since they
opted to increase their holdings of government securities instead.
This explains why•recent bids during weekly auctions of treasury
bills have reached as high as 12 to 18 billion pesos, compared with
offerings of about 5-5.5 billion pesos. Thus, it hasbeen argued that,
since private sector demand for funds was still down and interest
rates had already gone down to pre-crisis levels, it would have been
cheaper for the government to fund its 1999 pump-priming activities
from the domestic credit market (Lamberte et al. 1999). Strong118[ JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
demand for government securities works to the government's
advantage because it canincur lower financing costs forthe securities
it issues. The economy, however, may not gain anything ormay not
gain as much when banks invest in government securities instead
of releasing fresh funds that can be used more productively by the
private sector. Also, further declines in the treasury bill rate may
not be followed by equivalent drops in lending rates as banks
Struggle to maintain their profits.
While the government is doingits best to bring down the cost of
funds, cutting key rates and bringing down liquidity reserve
requirements do little to address the credit environment bankers
currently find themselves in. The issue of risk then becomes an issue
of confidence, both in the emerging positive economic trends and
the sustainability of the government's policy stance, in the context
of possible shifts in the international environment. Political issues
also added to the uncertainty, such as the proposed constitutional
amendment. If the banking sector is to play a more significant role
in the economy's recovery, stronger positive trends in the real sector
need to emerge. Thus, the role of fiscal policy in stimulating
aggregate demand is crucial. Banks are set to become more liquid
as bad debt portfolios are removed from their balance sheets. Any
premature tightening ofpolicy, however, could derail the economy's
still nascent recovery.
Macroeconomics and poverty
Stabilization policy in the Philippines typically relied on tight
fiscal and monetary policies. The social impact of this policy stance
was unmistakable. The reduction in social sector expenditures,
which was already deemed inadequate to begin with, came at a time
when demand for basic social services was expected to increase as
economic conditions deteriorated. The crisis also exposed the
underlying weakness of the government's fiscal position, which
relied primarily on privatization proceeds and expenditure cuts to
post a surplus. Abudget deficit ceiling ofP68.4 billion was originally
set with the IMF for 1999. This was raised to P85 billion when itMILO:CONTAGION EFFECTS 1119
becameapparent that theoriginal ceiling wouldbebreached dueto
poorrevenue collection. However,theactual amountwas a much
higher Pl13.6 biRion, oraround 3.6 percent OfGNP. Thereal concern
isnotthedeficit perse, buttheweak revenue performance and its
implications onthegovernment's intertemporal budget constraint.
Althoughthegovernmentattributed therevenue shortfall tothe
economic downturn, ultimately itwas due to weak tax
administration.
The government'sfiscal framework envisages a steady
improvement inits fiscal position beginning withalowerdeficit of
P62.5biUionintheyear2000, towarda smallsurplus overthe
medium term.But this improvementmust be derived from an
enhanced revenue effort. Otherwise, expenditures onpriority areas,
suchasinfrastructure, thesocial sector and anti-poverty programs,
may againbe sacrificed. The latter's adverse effect on economic
growthand social development iswellestablished. Furthermore,
without asustainable revenue base, the government will notbeable
tomanage its foreign debt burden, whichagain grewsignificantly.
asthegovernment shifted toforeign financing. Inwhichcase, the
bruntoftheadjustment will againfall on monetarypolicy, and
monetaryauthorities may againbeconstrained tomanage the
exchange rate veryconservatively viaa highinterest rate policy.
This was oneofthe factors that made thePhilippines vulnerable to
thecontagion effects oftheThaicrisis. Infact, theBSP Governor
had broached theidea ofincreasing its key overnight rates ffthe
recent weakening ofthepeso,which was inturndue tothe
government's higher fiscal deficit and some political concerns,
cont_ues.
The linkage between the conduct of monetary policy and the
poor has to do with the former's influence on economic prices that
affect the latter, both directly and indirectly. In particular, monetary
policy influences the inflation rate, interest rates, and the exchange
rate (Gochoco 1993).Monetary policy in the Philippines has typically
been used to defend the exchange rate. In the past, this was due to
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which constrained its ability to directly intervene in the foreign
exchange market. The exchange rate, in turn, was linked to the
foreign debt service of the government (Lim 1992). In particular,
high interest rates were used to prompt a switch to peso
denolninated assets, when an excess demand for foreign exchange
was evident. Domestic interest rates had to carry a premium to
compensate for the perceived risk of devaluation, which reflected
the concern that the peso was overvalued. This accounted for the
large differentials between domestic and foreign interest rates
(Krugman et al. 1991). Monetary authorities' penchant for a strong
peso was also because of its positive impact on inflation, given the
economy's dependence on imports. But the linking of the exchange
rate to financial flows was detrimental in that it brought about a
dichotomy between exchange rate policy and trade and industrial
policies (Lira 1992).
In contrast to the 1980s,;>the BSP became a net buyer of foreign
exchange in the 1990s because of the surge in capital inflows and
the consequent appreciation of the peso. However, monetary ceilings
set with the IMF resulted in the BSP sterilizing its foreign exchange
purchases. Thus, domestic interest rates remained high, which in
turn encouraged more capital inflows. Ultimately, monetary
authorities' continued conservative management of the exchange
rate gave rise to some perverse results. In particular, the very stable
and strong peso, which was deemed as overvalued, itself became a
source of instability. Since the target of policy was exchange rate
stability at the cost of a currency misalignment, the peso was
subjected to a number of speculative attacks, which culminated in
the mid-1997 currency crisis. Although the BSP was fairly successful
in defending the peso from speculative attacks prior to the 1997
currency crisis, there were economic costs. Allowing interest rates
to increase fended off speculators, but only temporarily.
Furthermore, it had adverse, longer-term effects on the banking
system, the pattern of investment, production, employment, growth,
-and ultimately the poor. That is why the BSP's use of high interest
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criticized for its failure to stem the fall of the peso and its adverse
effect on the economy. The BSP was urged to loosen up on its defense
of the local currency and to focus instead on bringing down interest
rates, which was deemed to have a greater impact on the economy
than the peso depreciation. The adjustment lag, especially in the
response of banks, underscores the importance of maintaining the
current low interest rate policy stance.
One major outcome of financial liberalization in a regime of
floating exchange rates was to increase the influence of financial
markets in exchange rate determination, with financial flows vastly
exceeding the value of international trade in goods and services.
Financial markets clear or adjust faster than real markets, hence the
overshooting of nominal (and real) exchange rates in the short run
(Dornbusch 1976), in response to surges in capital inflows. Over
time, as the impact of trade and industrial reforms become more
fully realized, underlying structural changes should exert greater
influence on the real exchange rate, moving it to a more realistic
level. However, in the interim, macroeconomic policies-fiscal and
monetary policies, external borrowing and exchange rate
management" also play an important role because of their impact
on aggregate demand and price levels, including the nominal
exchange rate. Thus, they can either reinforce, neutralize, or even
temporarily reverse the effects of structural changes on the real
exchange rate (World Bank 1987).
The choice of exchange rate regime depends on a number of
economic and political factors, including the nature Ofdisturbances,
the structure of the economy, the information available to agents,
and policymakers' preferences. Central bank intervention in the
foreign exchange market will have different objectives at different
times. Given the changing environment, the alternative is no longer
between fixed versus floating exchange rates. On the one hand, there
is the difficulty and cost of maintaining a fixed exchange rate in a
deregulated, globalized environment. On the other hand, leaving
exchange rates to be determined exclusively in a market that does
not always behave as an "efficient financial market", is also not17.2 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
tenable since the costs of ignoring speculative swings could be very
high (Macfarlane and Tease 1989; Curler et. al. 1990; Miller and
•Weller 1991). a Thus, there is a body of theoretical literature that
suggests that a purely fixed or flexible exchange rate would not
generally be optimal, given the diverse nature of shocks facing an
economy (Dornbusch 1993; Turnovsky 1994). Rather, some
intermediate degree of flexibility is seen as generally •best able to
stabilize the economy in response to economic disturbances. As
Krugrnan (1989) pointed out, exchange rate volatility, that is, high
frequency fluctuation around the "true" fundamental value, is not
necessarily an acceptable or even inevitable cost of allowing the
foreign exchange market to operate freely. However, efforts to
stabilize the exchange rate must also guard against inducing a
currency misalignment, or a persistent deviation from fundamentals.
Compared to the impact ofpersistent deviations ofthe exchange
rate from its long-run equilibrium value, the welfare costs of
exchange rate volatility seem to be rather small For instance, firms'
investment decisions may be distorted, even if they are perfectly
aware that a particular value for the exchange rate may be
unsustainable (Dixit 1989a,b). Also, international portfolio
investment that takes place when exchange rates are misaligned can
j'
lead to large welfare losses resulting from resource misallocation.
These suggest that the welfare costs of exchange rate misalignments
are likely to be substantial (Miller and Weller 1991). Although
excessive fluctuations in the exchange rate would also need to be
avoided in a still shallow and inefficient foreign exchange market,
greater exchange rate flexibility would also encourage the
development of forward markets, which would lead to improved
management of exchange rate risks. Then currency speculators
would bear the exchange rate risks, while hedgers (usually traders
and arbitrageurs) would be able to cover their foreign exchange
Amarket is said to be efficient if all available reformation is fully reflected in current market
prices. Miller and Weller (1991) discuss some arguments that have been forwarded to explain
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exposures in the forward market. Simply put, a poor exchange rate
policy risks misrepresenting true opportunities, and thus
misaUocating resources. Ultimately, the goal should be a competitive,
stable real exchange rate (Dornbusch 1993). Only then will the
Philippines undergo a structural experience in export development.
What the events of the past two years show is that the Philippines
has yet to escape the grip of a boom-bust cycle that had characterized
its economy for decades. That being said, the Philippine economy is
also one of the more open, transparent, deregulated and democratic
economies in the region. Thus, it is well poised to adapt to the
changing external environment, as well as take advantage of the
opportunities it affords. The importance of maintaining sound and
consistent policies cannot be overemphasized. Furthermore, care
has to be taken that the reforms are not reversed but deepened
further, both in the financial and the real sectors. The financial sector
is crucial because it serves as the mechanism through which
monetary policy is transmitted to the rest of the economy. The
financial system also Plays a very important role in facilitating
economic growth and prosperity by channeling funds from savers
to investors. The more competitive and efficient is this intermediation
process, the more likely it is that funds will be made available and
allocated according to their most productive uses. However, the
financial system does not operate in a vacuum, and inefficiencies
and distortions in the real sector will be reflected in the financial
sector: as well.
The fundamental restructuring of the Philippine economy
toward greater efficiency and competitiveness will necessarily hurt
certain sectors of the economy during the adjustment period,
especially in the short- to medium-run. Thus, policies need to be
designed such that they will hurt the poor the least, or distribute
the burden of the adjustment in the fairest manner possible (de Dios
1993). Clearly, properly designed and targeted social safety nets still
have an important role to play in alleviating the effects of
stabilization and structural adjustment measures. In particular, the
globalization of financial markets has resulted in labor bearing the124 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
brunt of adjustments to external shocks, as increased capital mobility
narrows the range of variation of returns to capital within a country
to match "world" rates (Rodrik 1997). The UNDP's Human
Development Report (1998) even went as far as saying that
globalization has been bad for the poor. Clearly, the importance of
an adequate system of social protection cannot be overly
emphasized.
SOCIAL SAFETY NET PROGRAMS IN THE PHILIPPINES
Safety net is a broad term that encompasses all informal, family-
based arrangements (or private safety nets), and all social security
programs antipoverty targeted interventions (or social safety nets).
That is,,it includes all cash and in-kind transfers. Social safety nets,
in turn, can be defined as those instruments that are specifically
aimed at mitigating potential adverse effects of reform measures on
the poor (Chu and Gupta 1998). In the Philippines, measures to ease
transitional problems during stabilization and structural reform, and
to protect the well-being.of the poor focused primarily on three types
of safety net programs: food subsidies, public employment
programs, and credit-based livelihood programs (Subbarao et al.
1996). The following sections,discuss some of the specific measures
that the Philippine government implemented under these programs
to alleviate the social impact of the contagion effects of the East Asian
crisis on the poor.
Food subsidy programs
The National Food Authority (NFA) launched the Enhanced
Retail Access for the Poor (ERAP) Sari-Sari Store 9 (ERAP-SSS),
Palengke ng Bayan*° (ERAP-PB) and Roiling Store (ERAP-RS) program
to ensure the availability, accessibility and affordability of basic food
commodities such as rice, coffee, sugar, cooking oil, milk, sardines
I.e., small community store.
loI.e., community wet market.MIL0" CONTAGION EFFECTS[125
Table 16. Number and distribution of ERAP stores as of July 1999
Region ERAP-SSS ERAP-FB ERAP-RS 1997 Poverty Unemployment
incidence (%) rate (Oct 1998)
Total 3,219 683 410 37.5 9.6
By region Percent distribution
NCR 10.8 12.9 19,3 9,6 15.1
CAR 5.3 2.3 2.4 49,4 8.9
I 7.1 14.6 4.9 44,7 8.2
II 6.2 7.5 3.4 38,0 4.1
III 15.0 9.1 10.5 20.1 11,9
IV 10.5 10.7 12.4 30,0 9.4
V 8.8 7.2 5,4 57.5 9,4
VI 2.7 0.7 3.9 48.2 8,0
VII 6.4 11.9 7.6 39,5 11,2
VIII 6.6 5.7 6.1 49,0 7,8
IX 4.1 .4.4 3.7 45.5 7.1
X 7.4 2.3 5.4 53.2 6,8
XI 4.6 5.1 6.3 44.6 8,7
XII 2.9 5.3 5.9 55.4 6,6
ARMM 1.6 0.3 2.9 63.8 4,8
Sources of basic data: National Food Authority; National Statistics Office;
National Statistical Coordination Board.
and noodles in the depressed and/or remote areas of the country.
Under the ERAP-SSS, the NFA accredited community stores owned
and operated either by private individuals, cooperatives, or
organizations to sell basic food commodities at subsidized prices.
The ERAP-PB is similar to the ERAP-SSS, only the former cover
stores located in the wet markets. The ERAP, RS are stores owned
and operated by the NFA itself using vans. Table 16 gives the number
of ERAP stores all over the country as of July 1999. The 1997 poverty126 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
incidence and 1995population are also shown to give an idea of the
stores' outreach. Once again, the bias in favor ofthe National Capital
Region (NCR) or Metro Manila was evident. In fact, of the estimated
4.659 million totalcustomers served by the ERAP-RSas of July 1999,
around 70 percent were from Metro Manila.
The government also implemented a rice subsidy program
beginning in January 1998, both in response to the financial crisis,
as well as the adverse weather patterns. The program's primary
objective was to provide affordable and quality rice to the subsistence
poor, i.e., those families living below the food threshold. The
program specifically targeted the identified CIDSS areas that were
also highly vulnerable to the adverse weather patterns. 11The
beneficiaries were given rice discount cards, which they used to
purchase rice at stores identified as rice retailers for the program.
The cards were nontransferable to other families and could only be
used by immediate members of the family. The amount of the
subsidy was 2.50 pesos per kilo regardless of the variation in the
prevailing price of rice.
Furthermore, a special action program for displaced sugar
workers was instituted in the form of an emergency loan package
of P100 million. They were also given rice subsidies and other
benefits. For instance, more than 15,000 sacks of rice worth around
P10 million were distributed to almost 77,000 sugar workers and
their families from August to November 1998 (Reyes et al. 1999).
While it is still too early to assess the impact of the food subsidy
programs discussed above, the NFA's past performance may prove
instructive. In particular, the NFA's past food subsidy programs
were found to have had little impact on the poor's consumption
and nutrition, and the low impact was achieved at a high cost.
Furthermore, the poorest income groups and regions did not receive
their share of benefits from the NFA's past food subsidy programs.
This was due to substantial leakages on account of poor targeting.
11Thatis, thebarangays inthetwolowest classes municipalities that were thetargeted
beneficiaries oftheFlagship ProgramonComprehensive andintegrated Delivery ofSocial
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Thus, it had been recommended that the NFA could eliminate
consumer subsidy without adversely affecting the poor's nutritional
status. The resources saved by doing so could then be used for a
better-targeted in-kind transfer program such as a food stamp
program or a nutrition program (Subbarao et al. 1996).
Public employment programs
The Rural Works Program under the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) was established to fund various small
infrastructure projects in order to generate employment in selected
depressed, rural communities, particularly those affected by
company closures and retrenchments, and the adverse weather
conditions. Regions in Mindanao (Region IX-Caraga) were initially
targeted because of the severe drough t in those areas, although the
program was eventually expanded to cover the Luzon (CAR, Regions
I-IV) and the Visayas regions (Regions V-VIII) as well. As of the
first quarter of 1999, more than 20 million pesos of project funds
had been released, which benefited more than 4,800 displaced
workers (see Table 17).
The Rural Works Program was part of the DOLE's
Comprehensive Program for Displaced Workers. Under this
program, the DOLE was also tasked to monitor trends in firm
closures and lay-offs, assist in job loss prevention, and provide
trainings and placement assistance for displaced workers. Thus, the
DOLE, through its regional offices and the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board, conducted dialogues with distressed
companies in order to avert or minimize job losses. In cases where
firm closure was inevitable, assistance was given to _acilitate the
release of separation pays and to help displaced workers avail of
loans that were made available especially for them. The DOLE also
established a registry of displaced workers for employment
assistance. Finally, the Technical Education and Skills Development
Authority (TESDA) provided various training courses. Table 18 gives
a summary of the number of workers that benefited under these
various schemes across regions.128 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
['able 17. DOLE's Rural Works Program as of la quarter 1999
Region ProjectCost No. of workers vs. No. of workers
(million benefited permanently laid off in
pesos) 1998
1. ProjectFund Released 20.361
CAR 4.006 322 483
Region I 1.400 351 543
Region Ill 1.000 223 8,390
Region IX 1.000 782 " 277
Region X 0.619 263 1,647
Region XI 0.800 682 3,439
Region XII 5.600 665 399
Caraga 5.936 1,549 1,032
2. Projectfor evaluation/
approval/implementa tton
Region II 0.570 111 356
Region IV 2.674 289 7,816
Region V 1.500 na 849
Region VI 7.221 562 3,242
Region VII 1.801 239 7,062
Region VIll 1.000 na 290
Note: Na mean,_data not available.
Source:Bureau of Labor and Employment Statistics.Table 18. Workers benefited by the DOLWs Comprehensive Program for Displaced Workers, 1998.
_Typeof A_-_st_e All NCR CAR I II Ill W V VI VII VIII IX X XI X]I
1.Job loss l_vem_m 8B84 4.58O 1,267 1,830 5 923 86 35 26 232
Job Saved 4,285 1,871 441 1,249 684 40
F_w-il/tatjm-, of
sepandionpay 4699 2,709 826 581 5 0 239 0 46 35 26 0 232
Z FanpIoyment a_ance
Registration 18,981 4,0_33 373 1,(138 410 5,841 585 189 12 552 380 1,071 2,770 1,707
,Cob Placement 3,.569 183 68 449 "306 52 97 87 15 739 1,573
3. Rural works program 4,837 322 351 223 782 263 682 665 1,549
(asoftst Q_r.)
4. TESDA I_aining_ 1,.549
5. Others
Special action program
[or so car workers 2308 1,000 250 1,058
Issuance of verification _._
¢erti_n for
emergency loans 34,177 28,589 .90 5,108 285 94 11
O
Folaldirect_ 2 21,247 4,763 390 1,800 2,046 1,830 5 52 1,020 1,058 868"385 "723 1,404 3,354 Z
rotalno,ofpermanent 79,3O8 43,480 483 543 356 8,390 7,816 849 3,242 7,062 290 277 1,647 3,4.39 399 1,032 _--_
Note: aExcept for Rural Works Progta_ lNo regional [neakdown; 7Conxfmted as Ihe sum of (1)-(4), plus Special acti(m _--o
program for sugar workers.
_: B_,_au of Labor and Employment Statist_130 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
In April 1999, a clean-up drive, the Linis Bayan program, was
launched to provide immediate casual employment, and at the same
time address environmental concerns. Although the clean-up drive
was a government initiative, private businesses were encouraged
to participate by hiring casual workers at the minimum wage rate
to be assigned to the program.
Public works programs can provide insurance to thepoor as an
employer of last resort, address the problem of seasonal
unemployment, create assets for the poor (such_as schools), or
provide disaster relief. In particular, public works programs can play
a major role in shifting the demand for labor and developing the
infras_'ucture base in the rural areas where most of the poor live.
The Rural Works Program, in that sense, was a step in the right
direction. But, as in the food subsidy programs, the concept of
targeting is crucial. If programs are targeted to the poor, employment
should be restricted with poverty targeting indicators, means-tests,
or self-targeting measures such as low wages (Subbarao et al. 1996).
Thus, the government'S current use of geographical targeting in
:allocating funds may not be enough to achieve the objective of
generating employment for the poor.
Credit-based livelihood programs
Of the government's three main forms of social safety nets,
probably the most developed and extensive were its credit-based
livelihood programs.
One of the flagship programs of the Social Reform Agenda was
on the expansion of credit to the poor. The implementing agency
was the People's Credit and Finance Corporation (PCFC), a
government nonbank financial institution. The PCFC was
established in February 1995. It was mandated to be the lead
institution in the wholesale delivery of microcredit funds to
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), people's organizations
(POs), and rural banks for relending to the poor or marginalized
sectors. It is wholly capitalized by the National Livelihood Support
Fund (NLSF), which was another entity established earlier to financeMILO:CONTAGION EFFECTS[131
credit-based livelihood programs under the supervision of the LBP
and the Department of Finance. Accredited conduits or partners of
the PCFC may obtain funds through the PCFC's two credit
programs- the Helping Individuals Reach their Aspirations through
Microcredit (HIRAM) Lending Program, and the Asian
Development Bank-International Fund for Agricultural
Development Rural Microenterprise Finance Project (ADB-IFAD/
RMFP).
The HIRAM program was initially funded at P100 million in
1996 by the NLSF. The NLSF also turned over to the PCFC a loan
portfolio of 63 active program partners worth around P103 million
in 1995. For NGOs and POs to become eligible conduits, they needed
to have a minimum track record of three years; working capital of
at least P250,000; at least 500 clients; past due rate of not more than
20 percent on its lending operations; and no loan arrears with other
lending institutions. Eligible financial institutions, on the other hand,
should have capital to risk assets ratio of 10 percent; past due rate of
not more than 20 percent on loans; no legal reserve deficiencies for
the year preceding its application; and at least 500 clients.
The RMFP, on the other hand, is funded by a US$34.7 million
loan from the ADB and the IFAD, which was contracted by the
government through the LBP. The loan was specifically intended
for the replication of the Grameen Bank Approach (GBA) in the
Philippines. It has a maturity of 40 years, although PCFC was given
20 years to repay the LBP following a grace period of 6 years from
1997. The loan from the LBP consisted of P1.2 billion for investment
credit and P22.56 million for institutional credit, at lending rates of
5.25 percent and I percent, respectively. Eligible partners under this
program must be experienced in the implementation of the GBA or
other social lending schemes; in operation for at least two years;
and with financial resources of at least P500,000 and a minimum
net worth of P250,000.
Both programs offer investment and institutional credits. The
former is used for relending to the target borrowers, while the latter
can be used by conduits to finance start-up costs, training of staff,IJOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
and preparation/training of the target borrowers. Lending rates are
currently at 12 percent and 3 percent, respectively. Pass-on rates.to
end users, on the other hand, range from 14 to 30 percent, depending.
on the conduit's spread. There is no ceiling on the\amount that •
conduits can borrow under HIRAM, but there is a ceiling of P3.5
million per annum per branch under the RMFP. For end-borrowers,
on the other hand, maximum loanable amounts are P25,000 and
FI4,000 under HIRAM and RMFP, respectively.
Table 19 shows PCFC's total number of active conduits and end-
clients served as of April 1999, while Table 20 presents its cumulative
lending under its two credit lines over the period 1997-April 1999.
The PFCF has disbursed a considerable amount for lending to the
poor since it began to operate - over P1.18 billion pesos, which
benefited a total of almost 120,000 borrowers. There has also beena
rapid increase in the number of active conduits of PCFC. Most of
the conduits, however, were located in Luzon but outside of Metro
Manila. The latter was due to PCFC's being based in Metro Manila,
and having no regional offices.
In terms of performance, the PCFC's HIRAM program was found
to be effective in reaching its target borrowers, while its RMFP
program had a low outreach capability. In terms of cost recovery,
however, both programs, failed to fully recoup their full costs of
implementation (Lamberte et al. 1998). On the other hand, PCFC's
reported collection rate was at a high 98.5 percent.
PCFC is not the only government agency involved in lending to
the poor, or directed credit programs in general. When the Asian
crisis broke out, there were 86 directed credit programs in operation
in the Philippines, which were being administered by different
departments/line agencies, government financial institutions (GFIs),
government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs), and
nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs). 12 These programs are
directed toward specific sectors, such as agriculture and rural sector,
nLamberte et al. (1997,1998) present a comprehensive review and assessment of these directed
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Table 19. PCFC's cumulative number of active conduits and end-clients
served, 1997-99
1997 1998 April 1999'
Active conduit_
HIRAM
NGO$ 21 20 18
Ruralbanks 16 28 37
Cooperatives 10 20 30.,
Cooperative banks 10 18 20
Thriftbanks 1 1 2





Cooperative banks 0 14 "
Total 15 41
No. of clients served
HIRAM 39,962 70,175 99,921
RMFP ' 0 1,550 19,649
Source:People's Credit and Finance Corporation.
low income and poor communities, disadvantaged groups, and smaU
and medium enterprises. They are primarily funded by government
budgetary allocations, special funds, and official development
assistance from bilateral and multilateral donor organizations in the
form of grants or loans.
The basic rationale for these programs is that the target.sectors
have inadequate access to formal sources of credit, which in turn154 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
Table 20. PCFC's cumulative approved credit lines and loan releases, 1997-99
fin '000 pesos)
Cumulative amount Cumulative amount
approved 'released
HIRAM RMFP HIRAM RMFP
hwestment credit
1997 388,600 a 0 345,299 _ 0
1998 527,450 117,500 732,026 8,500
April 1999 681,650 327,800 1,039,491 108,147
Institutional credit
1997 32,782 0 19,197 0
1998 35,902 18,595 22,816 0
April 1999 49,587 40,252 25,155 8,624
Note: aAmounts included loans that PCFC absorbed from the NLSF in 1996.
Source: People's Credit and Finance Corporation.
impairs their capacity to generate employment and income. Many
of these programs, however, do not just provide credit but also
include technical assistance in the form of institution and skill
building and support services, especially those that are being
administered by the various government departments such as the
Departments of Agriculture, Trade and Industry, Labor and
Employment, and Social Welfare and Development. Credit-based
livelihood programs, for instance, were introduced to expand self-
employment opportunities for the poor. The provision of subsidized
credit, training, and other services to promote self-employment was
thought to be the answer to the Philippines' slow economic growth
and labor absorption. In fact, livelihood programs became the
cornerstone of the Aquino and Ramos governments' poverty
alleviation schemes, which accounts for the fact that many of these
programs were conceived after 1986. Of the existing programs, at
least 13 directly target the poor and disadvantaged sectors, while
around 24 directly target the agriculture and rural sector.MILO"CONTAGION EFFECTS]135
In general, the results of Lamberte et al. (1997, 1998) showed
that credit programs administered by government financial
institutions, which consist of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), were more
effective in terms of reaching the target borrowers, and efficient in
terms of cost recovery, relative to the GOCCs, NBFIs, and the
nonfinancial government agencies. While the latter agencies in
general performed fairly in terms of outreach, they did so very
inefficiently. However, sustained inefficiency will ultimately affect
• a credit program's effectiveness because itwill hinder the expansion
and sustainability of the credit program. The credit programs run
by the different government departments/line agencies were found
to be even more inefficient. This was attributed to the supplementary
nature of such programs, which made the setting of performance
standards and independent assessment difficult. Hence, their
emphasis was only on effectiveness. Government departments were
also more prone to politicians' interventions.
Cost inefficiency of most of the government's directed credit
programs had to do with the programs' social preparation
component (which involved prelending activities such as institution
and capacity building, and various forms of training), which
represented unrecoverable costs for the government. Moreover, since
the loans were either interest-free or carried subsidized rates, the
programs did not recover operations, administrative and other costs,
making them insufficient and unsustainable, and/or dependent on
budget donations and allocations. However, it must be made clear
that credit is not welfare and loans from the government are not
dole-outs. Thus, Lamberte et al. (1998) recommended that the
management of all directed credit pFograms of the government be
transferred to the GFIs, which have clear guidelines and
accountability, and are directly supervised by the BSP. This would
allow the other government agencies to focus on their primary
functions, as well as save scarce government resources. The PCFC's
abolition, notwithstanding its fairly good performance, was also
recommended since it only added another administrative layer. A136 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
consolidation of the government's directed credit programs is dearly
warranted because of the many overlaps. The fungibility of credit
also requires strictly targeted interventions. Finally, a reorientation
of directed credit programs towards cost recovery, which in turn
would help make them viable and sustainable, may be justifiable
since it is often claimed that the poor's problem is not cost but access
to credit.
The indirect mode of credit delivery was also found to be more
effective, that is, the use of conduits especially those that are closely
connected to the end-borrowers, such as community-based and
group-lending methods. An earlier study of microfinance
institutions (MFIs) in the Philippines (Llanto et al. 1996) also affirmed
the effectiveness of the targeting mechanism used by the MFIs in
identifying poor clients. However, most MFIs' weak institutional
capacity, lack of a viable and extensive delivery system, small
financial base, and huge investments in training clients hamper their
attempts to reach a greater number of their target clientele. In the
short run, MFIs may be able to expand their present reach, but
because they are not viable or sustainable financial institutions, the
effort cannot be sustained. Hence, their reliance on financial
assistance from the government and donor funds for continued
operation.
The experiences of other countries with respect to MFIs,
particularly in Latin America, show that they need to be financially
viable in order for them to provide credit to an increasing proportion
of significantly large numbers of poor people on a sustained basis
(Christen et al. 1995). Viability can be achieved through an
appropriate interest rate policy, administrative efficiency and
volume. Microfinance should not be treated as charity because if it
is, then it will lead to a lot of problems, as attested to by earlier
directed credit programs of the government. In addition to
demonstrating the credit worthiness of its own borrowers, an MFI
must likewise demonstrate its own viability.
The principal objectives of livelihood programs are to open up
lines of credit to the poor, which in turn would help them to createMILO :CONTAGION EFFECTS 1137
sustainable livelihoods. Sustainability is critical. The subsidy can
be rationalized if a family is permanently lifted out of poverty. On
the other hand, the subsidy would amount to a transfer if the benefits
are short-lived or if the borrower defaults. Such programs, then,
need to be evaluated based on targeting, costs and benefits, and
sustainability. However, studies have shown that the income and
employment effects of livelihood programs were only short-term.
That is, they provided temporary financial relief rather than
livelihood creation (Subbarao et al. 1996). Thus, while such programs
may prove useful as short-term tools, for instance to alleviate the
adverse effects of stabilization and structural adjustment measures
on employment, they cannot be relied upon to permanently address
poverty and, therefore, should not be the cornerstone of any poverty
alleviation scheme. Furthermore, there may be more efficient ways
of effecting the transfer rather than through subsidized credit.
•Overall, given the issues in the management of the various social
safety net programs in the Philippines, and the necessity of rendering
such programs fiscally sustainable, the focus of public policy should
be on redirecting resources and effecting design changes rather than
on the provision of additional resources per se. Furthermore, the
transfer programs must not be seen as substitutes to basic social
•services. Even if cash and in-kind transfers are maintained at
generous• levels, but access to health care and education is eroded,
then the poor will not benefit in the long run (Subbarao et al. 1996).
Addressing the problem of poverty requires that government be
•pragh_atic in its use of scarce resources. In essence, this should entail
greater allocation of the national budget for basic social services such
as health and nutrition, education and training, andhousing and
social welfare, all of which should be elficienfly designed to reach
the poor. But again, ultimately, the focus should still be on broad-
based economic growth to generate •and sustain gainful employment
and livelihood opportunities for the poor.MILO :CONTAGION EFFECTS 1141
There were various social safety nets in placewhen the crisis
broke out, which helped to alleviate its adverse social impact.
However, they were generally inadequate both quantitatively and
qualitatively. Overall, the main issues in the management of the
government's various social safety net programs were targeting and
efficiency. Thus, the focus of public policy should be on redirecting
resources and effects, g design changes rather than on the provision
of additional resources per se. However, the issue of efficiency in
the use of resources is a pervading one in all of the government's
programs, and not just with respect to its social safety net progran_.
The issue becomes even more critical as the government's fiscal
position took a turn for the worse as a result of the crisis. In fact, a
recent study noted that in addition to the fiscal crunch, some long
identified structuralweaknesses in resourceallocation have persisted
and even worsened (Pineda 1999). The World Bankeven estimated
the cost Ofcorruption in the Philippines, and placed it at around
US$48 billion over the past 20years.
In that sense, the World Bank and the IMF's recent focus on the
government's fiscal position was warranted. However, the lynchpin
should not be the level of the fiscal deficit per se, but improved
revenue performance and greater efficiency. Ideally, fiscal
adjustments toward greater efficiency in the use of public resources
should cut across the different departments and types of
expenditures. Nevertheless, if they cannot be done simultaneously,
then inefficiencies elsewhere should first be dealt with before the
inefficiencies in the social safety net and social expenditure
programs. Otherwise, the more vulnerable members and sectors of
society may be hit from both sides, with the private sector still
undergoing a period of adjustment as a result of the crisis. Also,
there is a growing body of literature that seeks to characterize and
measure the adverse impact ofglobalization, particularly offinancial
markets, on labor and on the poor (e.g., Rodrik 1997, 1998; Diwan
1999). In particular, the globalization offinancial markets is deemed
to have resulted in labor bearing the brunt of adjustments to external
shocks, as increased capital mobility narrows the range ofvariation1421 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
of returnstocapita ! within acountry tomatch "world" rates (Rodrik
1997). The UNDP's Human Development Report (1998)even went
as faras saying that globalization has been bad for the poor. Thus,
the importance of an adequate system of social protection cannot be
overly emphasized.
Two years after the crisis broke out, President Estrada launched
his own anti-poverty program, which had an allocation of 2.5 billion
pesos. Doubtless some of his pronouncements were overambitious;
even unrealistic and impossible to achieve. Forinstance, there was
his declaration to liberate 10 million Filipinos from poverty, which
is around a third of the Filipino poor, over the next five years. His
program would initially target the 100 poorest families in each of
the 1,600 cities and towns, who would then receive integrated and
comprehensive services from the government. Around 160,000
households orabout I million Filipinos were expected tobereached.
Itwas a start, albeit asmall one, considering that there were already
over 4.5 million poor families prior to the crisis. But the strategy
was criticized for being narrowly focused and simplistic. It was also
pointed out that its design and implementation were full ofleakages.
Furthermore, the program did not address the key issues
involving poverty in the Philippines. It has been noted that poverty
in the Philippines was a "structural" problem. Thus, longer term
solutions must go beyond dole-outs and address the key issues. For
instance, there has been no significant shift of resources to the social
sector in the national budget. In fact, compared with their 1998levels,
the 1999appropriations for the DSWD, DOH, and DECS were lower
in real terms by 22, 20, and 4.5 percent, respectively (Pineda 1999).
Investment in human capital is one such policy that will have a
lasting positive impact on the poor and poverty alleviation. One of
the things that were made evident by the country's economic
performance prior to the crisis was the responsiveness and capacity
of the private sector, given the proper incentives and business
environment. One of the challenges for the government, then, is to
continue to nurture such an environment, arid to deal with suchMILO CONTAGION EFFECTS]143
basic functions as maintaining peace and order, and the
administration of justice.
A more progressive approach to poverty alleviation, and the
provision of social services and social safety nets is necessary to
cushion the impact of required structural adjustments on the more
vulnerable sectors of society. Simply put, the government needs to
do more and to do so more efficiently, in order to make a truly sizable
impact on poverty. Growth per se may not lead to socially optimizing
outcomes. What matters is not just the level of economic growth,
but its overall quality in terms of providing sustained employment
and improving income distribution across income groups and
regions. Ultimately, "Poverty is an unacceptable human condition.
It isnot immutable; public policy and action can, and must, eliminate
poverty. This is what development is all about" (ADB 1999).
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